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THE WAITE COURT AT THE BAR OF HISTORY
DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
"I have at last finished the opinion," Chief Justice Waite wrote to
Bancroft Davis, the Court's Reporter of Decisions, on March 5, 1888.
One suspects that Waite audibly exhaled as he penned that sentence.2 His
reference was to the Telephone Cases,3 arguably the most significant
patent litigation in the late nineteenth century, at least in terms of its ef-
fects on the development of the telecommunications industry in the
United States. Waite had been at work on his opinion for months, and
understandably so.4 Arguments in the cases had been heard over twelve
days in January and February 1887.5 The bench had split four to three
over these eight challenges in circuit courts to Alexander Graham Bell's
1876 patent for the telephone. 6 A description of each of the patent dis-
putes, Waite's opinion sustaining the patent, and Justice Bradley's much
shorter dissent, all consumed more than five hundred pages-the entirety
of volume 126 of the United States Reports.7 Waite's effort had been a
burden, even for a Chief Justice accustomed to overwork.
The decision was scheduled to come down on Monday, March 19.8
On Sunday, the eighteenth, the Chief Justice became ill.9 He insisted
nonetheless on going to the Capitol the following day to read his opinion,
despite an apparent diagnosis of pneumonia. 10 He was concerned that his
wife Amelia, then traveling in California, would be alarmed if she read
newspaper accounts of his inability to be at Court.1 She knew that he
had never fully regained his stamina following a breakdown in 1885,
which caused his absence from the bench for a short time.12 After Waite
arrived in the courtroom on the nineteenth, however, it was immediately
t The title derives from an article written over a half century ago by one of Professor
Beaney's colleagues at Princeton: Alpheus Thomas Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal to the
Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1952).
1. C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 309 (1963)
(internal quotations omitted).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
4. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 309 (noting that the Telephone Cases considered several
extremely complex telephone patent disputes).
5. The Telephone Cases, 31 L. Ed. 863, 864 (1888).
6. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 1 (syllabus).
7. See generally id. (syllabus).
8. See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 309.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 309-10.
11. Id. at 309.
12. See id.
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clear that he was too weak to carry on. 13 Justice Blatchford announced
the judgment in the Telephone Cases in his place.' 4 Attorney General
Augustus Garland later recalled the spectacle of the enfeebled Chief: "'It
was evident to the observer death had almost placed its hand upon
him." ' 15 On the morning of Friday, March 23, in his seventy-second year,
"Mott" Waite died at home, fourteen years and nineteen days after Jus-
tice Nathan Clifford had sworn in the lawyer from Toledo.
16
Predecessors John Marshall, Roger Brooke Taney, and Salmon
Portland Chase had also died in harness, as would later Chief Justices
Melville Weston Fuller, Edward Douglass White, Harlan Fiske Stone,
and Fred Vinson. 17 Alongside his six predecessors, Waite served longer
than all but John Marshall and Taney, whose combined tenures practi-
cally encompassed the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. 8
Among the sixteen Chiefs to date, as shown in Table 1, Waite's tenure
ranks sixth. Fuller, whom President Grover Cleveland picked as his suc-
cessor, would serve eight years longer than Waite; but after Fuller, no
Chief Justice would exceed the length of Waite's service until Eisen-
hower appointee Earl Warren, who retired in 1969.19
The fifteen Justices who made up the Waite bench are listed in Ta-
ble 2. They were, by and large, an impressive team, both professionally
and intellectually. The list included some individuals-Justices Samuel
Miller, Stephen Field, Joseph Bradley, and John Marshall Harlan, for
example-who, in the terminology of competitive athletics, would have
been considered "starters" or even "all stars" in any period of Supreme
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 309-10 (quoting A. H. GARLAND, EXPERIENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 36 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1963 (1898))).
16. See id. at 310. Eight months passed before President Grant found a replacement for Chief
Justice Chase, who died on May 7, 1873. Id. at 2. Waite's nomination on January 19, 1874 marked
the end of an appointment charade. See id. at 5 (calling the appointment process "tragicomic"). "We
had 'a time' over the Chief Justiceship," Secretary of State Hamilton Fish exclaimed on the day of
the nomination. Id. at 2 (citation omitted). "It has been a hard parturition ..... Id. (citation omitted).
By most accounts, the Ohio lawyer who succeeded Chase was Grant's seventh choice for the post.
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE
SUPREME COURT 131 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining Waite's newly acquired nickname: "His Acci-
dency"). Grant had apparently never met Waite; indeed, Waite was not widely known outside the
Buckeye State and had never argued a case before the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. He had "every
requisite except repute," insisted Senator Hannibal Hamlin in January in a last-ditch effort to fore-
stall his nomination. ALFRED R. CONKLING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF ROSCOE CONKLING 463
(1889).
Waite's name was surely familiar to Grant. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 15-16. Friends had rec-
ommended him for the Chief Justiceship months before. Id. at 15. Moreover, he had been one of
three American attorneys at the international arbitration over the Alabama claims, which resulted in
an award of $15.5 million for the United States, one of the few achievements of Grant's third-rate
and scandal-ridden presidency. Id. at 13-14.
17. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 65, 120,
194-95, 250, 275, 365,425 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT JUSTICES].
18. See id. at 531.
19. See SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 531-32; infra tbl.1.
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Court history.2 ° Moreover, the Waite bench had both strength and depth
in the second tier. There was the Chief Justice himself, plus colleagues
Samuel Blatchford, David Davis, Horace Gray, Stanley Matthews, Wil-
liam Strong, L.Q.C. Lamar (at the very end), and perhaps William
Woods.2' These men could have more than held their own as members of
22any Court before or since. For twelve of the fifteen Justices to have
performed at a level ranging from able and workmanlike to outstanding
is remarkable. The fact that some members of the Waite Court have not
been acclaimed as such may be due more to the routine nature of much
of nineteenth century judicial business-"routine," that is, by late twenti-
eth and early twenty-first century standards.23 A study commissioned in
1970, to rank the ninety-six Justices who served between 1789 and 1967,
suggests that the Waite Court Justices were, as a group, unusually capa-
ble. Harlan is counted among the twelve that the study deemed "great,"
and Miller, Field, Bradley, and Waite are among the fifteen "near
greats. 25 Nine Justices (Blatchford, Clifford, Davis, Gray, Hunt, Lamar,
Matthews, Swayne, and Strong) are among the fifty-five receiving an
"average" mark, and only Woods is lodged among the six earning the
,,26grade of "below average. None were among the eight judged "fail-
ure."27 Few periods of Supreme Court history fare as well or better in the
28survey.
Talented people, however, are frequently strong-willed people. That
was true of Waite's colleagues. Moreover, several of them thought they,
not Waite, should have been named Chief Justice in 1874, and some con-
tinued to believe that they could have done a better job in the center
chair.29 The Waite Court may not have been "nine scorpions in a bottle,"
as Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes was supposed to have described a later
Court on which he sat, but by no means was Waite's a friction-free
bench.30 These realities, combined with some peculiar difficulties, caused
20. See ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 412-413.
21. See id. at 120, 128, 131, 133, 138-39, 141-42.
22. "Court," when used here as a proper noun, refers either to the United States Supreme
Court generally, or to that Court during the period in which it was headed by a particular Chief
Justice, as in the "Hughes Court" (1930-1941) or the "Burger Court" (1969-1986).
23. This assessment is based on the evaluation presented in chapter 2 of DONALD GRIER
STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY (Peter G. Renstrom ed.,
2003).





29. See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 7.
30. The quoted words come from the title: MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE:
GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Richard Cummings ed., 1994); see also Rich-
ard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990).
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by the weaker members of Waite's roster, posed special challenges for
the Chief s leadership skills.
31
Moreover, Waite's fourteen years were hardly quiescent ones. In-
deed, institutionally, politically, and legally, they were eventful, and in
some ways even tumultuous. 32 First, in the constitutional crisis of 1876-
1877, several Supreme Court Justices helped to resolve a disputed presi-
dential election. 33 Second, the Waite bench may fairly be described as the
hardest working in American history. Under no other Chief Justice has
the Court encountered so many cases for so long a time that it was
obliged to decide. 34 Indeed, the experience of the Waite years demon-
strated the unworkability and inadequacy of the federal judicial system as
it was then organized. 35 The result was a major structural and jurisdic-
tional reorganization soon after the Chief's death.36 Third, alongside the
hundreds of routine, fact-bound cases, the Court, in those days, was
obliged to decide important constitutional questions.37 A few of these had
been fixtures in the Reports for decades, but others, thanks to the three
Reconstruction amendments, were just beginning to crowd their way
onto the docket as Waite became Chief Justice.38 Waite was probably too
close to his work to appreciate fully the changes that were underway.
Yet, had he been given the perspective afforded by the hindsight of more
than a century, he would have recognized the situation for what it was:
the United States Supreme Court was an institution truly in transition.
31. See generally MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 251-275 (detailing Chief Justice Waite's diffi-
culty keeping relations positive with other Justices such as Justice Clifford; also describing the
numerous health problems that plagued several Justices of the Waite Court).
32. See generally id. at 313-21 (describing the Waite Court's decisions involving civil rights,
corporations, and bondholders).
33. See DAVID M. O'BREN, STORM CENTER 96 (5th ed. 2000).
34. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 58 tbl.2-2 (3d ed. 2003).
35. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 177 (1993); MAGRATH,
supra note 1, at 266-267.
36. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 177.
37. See id. at 164, 166, 169 (discussing decisions interpreting the Constitution, upholding the
states' power to regulate, determining that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to private ac-




Table 1 - Tenures of the Chief Justices of the United States
39
Appointing Tenure as Rank Order in
Chief Justice President Chief Justice Years of Service'
Jay Washington 1789-1795 11th (6 yrs.)
Rutledge*# Washington 1795 14"' (1 yr.)
Ellsworth Washington 1796-1800 13th (4 yrs.)
Marshall Adams 1801-1835 1st (34 yrs.)
Taney Jackson 1836-1864 2nd (28 yrs.)
Chase, S. P. Lincoln 1864-1873 9th (tie)(8 yrs.)
Waite Grant 1874-1888 6th (14 yrs.)
Fuller Cleveland 1888-1910 3d (22 yrs.)
White, E.+  Taft 1910- 1921 8"' (10 yrs.)
Taft Harding 1921-1930 9"' (tie)(8 yrs.)
Hughes# Hoover 1930-1941 7 h (11 yrs.)
Stone' Roosevelt, F. 1941-1946 12h (5 yrs.)
Vinson Truman 1946-1953 10t" (7 yrs.)
Warren Eisenhower 1953-1969 5"' (15 yrs.)
Burger Nixon 1969-1986 4 h (tie) (17 yrs.)
Rehnquist**+ Reagan 1986 - 4th (tie) (17 yrs.)**
* Served on a recess appointment; nomination rejected by the Senate.
** To date, as of 2003.
' Rounded off to nearest year, from date of judicial oath.
+ Sworn in as Chief Justice while serving as associate Justice. Years
shown exclude service as associate Justice.
4 Previous service as associate Justice terminated before appointment
as Chief Justice. Years shown exclude service as associate Justice.
39. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 531.
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Table 2 - Justices of the Waite Court (1874-1888), in Order of
Appointment4 °
Justice Appointed Nominated Confirmed Judicial Service
by on on Oath Taken Ended
Nathan Buchanan 12-9-1857 1-12-1858 1-21-1858 7-25-1881
Clifford
Noah Lincoln 1-21-1862 1-24-1862 1-27-1862 1-24-1881
Swayne
Samuel Lincoln 7-16-1862 7-16-1862 7-21-1862 10-13-1890
Miller
David Lincoln 12-1-1862 12-8-1862 12-10-1862 3-4-1877
Davis
Stephen Lincoln 3-6-1863 3-10-1863 5-20-1863 12-1-1897
Field
William Grant 2-7-1870 2-18-1870 3-14-1870 12-4-1880
Strong
Joseph Grant 2-7-1870 3-21-1870 3-23-1870 1-22-1892
Bradley
Ward Hunt Grant 12-3-1872 12-11-1872 1-9-1873 1-27-1882
Morrison Grant 1-19-1874 1-21-1874 3-4-1874 3-23-1888
Waite
John Hayes 10-16-1877 11-29-1877 12-10-1877 10-14-1911
Harlan
William Hayes 12-15-1880 12-21-1880 1-5-1881 5-14-1887
Woods
Stanley Garfield 3-14-1881 5-12-1881 5-17-1881 3-22-1889
Matthews
Horace Arthur 12-19-1881 12-20-1881 1-9-1882 9-15-1902
Gray
Samuel Arthur 3-13-1882 3-27-1882 4-3-1882 7-7-1893
Blatchford
L.Q.C. Cleveland 12-6-1887 1-16-1888 1-18-1888 1-23-1893
Lamar
I. PART CLASSICAL, PART MODERN: THE WAITE BENCH AS A
TRANSITION COURT
The Waite Court can usefully be viewed as a transition court, strad-
dling a period during which the Supreme Court underwent an unprece-
40. See id. at 531-33.
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dented metamorphosis from what might be called the classical Court to
the modem Court. This is different nomenclature from what sometimes
is found in literature about the Supreme Court.4 ' Yet a classical/modern
distinction may better highlight the place of the Waite era in Supreme
Court history, making it easier to grasp the ways in which the Waite
Court was both similar to, and different from, the Courts that preceded
and followed it.
Supreme Court nomenclature often draws a contrast between the old
pre-1937 Court and the new post-1937 Court (or, sometimes, the modem
Court).42 By most accounts, the dividing line between the two falls dur-
ing the years 1937-1940, when the nation witnessed a judicial revolu-
tion.43 The proverbial "irresistible force" (in the form of President Frank-
lin Roosevelt's New Deal program to cope with the Great Depression)
met the "immovable object" (in the form of the Supreme Court under the
leadership of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that stymied many of
the president's initiatives).44 The result was Roosevelt's audacious as-
sault on the Court through the Court-packing plan, and the hasty change
of mind by Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts, that gave Roosevelt the
five sure votes he needed so that his agenda could receive the constitu-
tional stamp of approval.45 This flip-flop was promptly followed by the
Court's adoption of a new agenda for itself.46
From this perspective, the old Court in its constitutional decisions
was property-oriented, with an emphasis on minimizing the restrictive
role of government in commercial affairs.47 With commercial interests
enjoying heightened protection, legislation regulating property was con-
stitutionally acceptable only if the Court was satisfied that the policy was
reasonable.48 The agenda of the new Court, by contrast, turned that order
of things on its head, guarding mainly the nonproprietary rights and lib-
41. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 110, 114-15 (1988) (discussing scholars labeling the Court in the period of 1873-1937 as the
"formalist era" or "laissez-faire," and labeling the Court post-1937 as "modem").
42. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 180 (1960); see also
WIECEK, supra note 41, at 139.
43. See generally CARL BRENT SWISHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 28-29
(Greenwood Press 1980) (1958) (describing the late 1930s as the renaissance of constitutional inter-
pretation); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 154, 160-
61, 175 (2d prtg. 1963) (outlining the "judicial about-face" that brought the 1938 doctrines of "pre-
ferred freedoms, judicial self-restraint, and political restraints .... "); SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at
233-45 (discussing what commentators called the "Constitutional Revolution Ltd.," beginning in
1937).
44. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 232.
45. See id. at 233-36.
46. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also WIECEK,
supra note 41, at 156-57 (discussing Carolene Products' adoption of an equal protection agenda).
47. See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 116.
48. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905); SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 244;
MASON, supra note 43, at 119.
2003]
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erties of individuals.49 Ever since, property matters have been deemed
less important than, for example, free speech or criminal justice issues,
and so have been far less deserving of judicial protection than rights in
the preferred category. 50 Accordingly, since the late 1930s, regulation of
property has largely been left to the discretion (and protection) of legisla-
tures, and are only rarely struck down, while restrictions on speech and
similar liberties are typically viewed as constitutionally suspect.
51
To be sure, the categories of old Court and new Court, as they are
usually understood, are helpful in understanding a prominent watershed
in Supreme Court history. Yet they may obscure as much as they reveal
in grasping both fundamental changes in the Court's development across
more than two centuries, and the Waite bench's position in that devel-
opment. For this task, different nomenclature seems appropriate: hence
the categories of classical Court and modem Court (albeit with the "new"
or post-1937 Court being a subset of the latter). Compared to the rela-
tively sudden transformation after 1937, the shift from classical to mod-
em Court moved more slowly, spanning approximately the last one-third
of the nineteenth century.52 Waite's Chief Justiceship, therefore, fell
roughly in the middle of this period.53
The era of the classical Court was marked by (1) an exceedingly
limited federal jurisdiction, (2) a structure that made the bench mainly a
court of errors, not a court of legal policy, and (3) onerous circuit-riding
duties.54 Until after the Civil War, the great bulk of litigation in the fed-
eral courts consisted of admiralty and diversity cases. 55 Cases in the Su-
preme Court that raised federal constitutional questions usually came
from the highest court of a state; under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, these qualified for Supreme Court review only if the court below
had ruled against the federal claim.56
49. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 281-83 (describing the "preferred-position theory,"
under which the Constitution gives a preferred status to personal rights rather than property rights).
"The modem Court has turned away due process challenges to economic regulation with a broad
'hands off approach. No such law has been invalidated on substantive due process grounds since
1937." GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 482-83 (13th ed.
1997).
50. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 281.
51. Id. at 281-82; see HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT
7 (7th ed. 1998).
52. Author's interpretation of developments between ratification of the three Reconstruction
amendments to the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV, and passage of the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
53. See supra tbl. 1.
54. See O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at 107, 156-57; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 12
(W.M.W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993) (1927).
55. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 12.
56. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 11 -12 (1928).
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Moreover, except for admiralty and a handful of other cases, the
Supreme Court was the sole tribunal in existence to hear appeals within
the federal judicial system (the circuit courts were principally trial, not
appellate, bodies).57 There was no intermediate appellate bench between
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.58 Thus, as Table 3 suggests,
much of the Justices' energy was expended reviewing circuit court deci-
sions, regardless of their importance.
TABLE 3 - Number of Cases Pending in the U.S. Supreme Court,
1850-189059
Every case in federal court, it seemed, had an equal claim on the
Supreme Court's time, unless it was a criminal case. Congress did not
extend a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, even in capital cases, from
the circuit courts until 1889.60 Thus, unless a criminal case managed to
reach the Supreme Court through some extraordinary route such as ha-
beas corpus or by certification, the federal trial (i.e., circuit) court had the
final word in criminal cases.6'
The burden of review by right of an ever-expanding number of cir-
cuit court rulings was compounded by the system of judicial staffing that
Congress had decreed in 1789.62 There were three types of federal courts
57. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 13 (citing the Act of September 24, 1789,
§§13, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 80, 85).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 60, 86.
60. Id. at 79 n.107 (citing United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 174 (1805); Act of
Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655; United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 321-22 (1892)).
61. Id.; More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 173-74.
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(district, circuit, and the Supreme Court), but only two types of federal
judges (district judges and Supreme Court Justices).63 Every state con-
tained at least one federal judicial district, and some states contained
more than one district. 64 Districts in two or more states were in turn
combined to form a circuit.65 A circuit court for a district would be
staffed by the local district judge and a Supreme Court Justice.66 Thus, at
the time Waite became Chief Justice, the Circuit Court for the District of
New Hampshire was staffed by the district judge in that state, plus Na-
than Clifford, who was the designated Justice for the First Circuit, which
included all of New England, except Vermont and Connecticut. 6 If the
circuit Justice was unable to be present, and this was sometimes the case,
the district judge held circuit court by himself.68 Thus the circuit court
was, practically speaking, often a replica of the district court. Except for
a brief period in 1801 when Congress created separate circuit judge-
ships69 (a new Congress repealed that measure in 1802)70 and a geogra-
phy-driven creation of a circuit judgeship for California in 1855,71 there
were no distinct circuit judges until 1869, when Congress also reduced
the circuit-riding duties of the Justices. 72 Thereafter, Justices were ex-
pected to sit on the circuit court bench in each district only once every
two years.73
The era of the modern Court has been marked by (1) a vastly ex-
panded federal jurisdiction, (2) an increase in cases involving individual
rights, and (3) a structure that has allowed the Court to become a court of
policy for the nation.74 The three Reconstruction amendments to the
Constitution (the Thirteenth in 1865, 75 the Fourteenth in 1868,76 and the
Fifteenth in 187077), combined with congressional statutes intended to
63. §§ 1, 3, 4, 1 Stat. at 73-75.
64. § 2, 1 Stat. at 73.
65. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 11.
66. Initially, two Justices were assigned to hold court on a circuit. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75. This
number was reduced to one in 1793. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333-34. As a
result, six Justices (the size of the Supreme Court's initial roster) were available for the original three
circuits. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 22.
67. See table titled, "Allotments, Etc. of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States" preceding the table titled, "General Table of the Cases Reported in this Book." 23 L. Ed. 6
(1926).
68. See JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL,
1784-1860, at 142-43 (1964); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 109 (noting that it was
becoming common practice for district judges to hold court alone).
69. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90 (repealed in 1802).
70. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132, 132 (repealed in 1911).
71. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631, 631.
72. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45.
73. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 74.
74. ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 51, at 5 (commenting on the federal judiciary's role in
strengthening basic civil rights); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-6 (12th ed. 1999).
75. J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 382-83
(14th ed. 1997).
76. Id. at 385-86.
77. ld. at 432.
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enforce those amendments, imposed new restrictions on state authority as
a means of protecting individual rights.78
Moreover, the "convenient vagueness" in the language of the all-
important Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment presented the Su-
preme Court with unprecedented opportunities to determine just how
broad or narrow the protections for individual rights would be. 79 The
inclusion of the Equal Protection Clause was itself a noteworthy event
because it handed the Supreme Court a far-reaching and entirely new
mission-to be the final arbiter on matters of racial justice.80 To be sure,
the other guaranties of Section One, regarding privileges and immunities
and due process of law, were litigated initially more in the context of
restrictions on occupational freedom and uses of property than they were
in the context of attacks on racial discrimination.8 In the eighteenth and
82nineteenth centuries, property interests were critical civil rights issues.
Property was seen as the indispensable basis of freedom. 83
The addition of those amendments proved even more significant for
the federal judiciary because of the major jurisdictional leap Congress
took in 1875. It was then that Congress granted the circuit courts full
Article III jurisdiction-the authority to entertain suits involving a stat-
ute, the Constitution, or a treaty of the United States, as well as a right of
removal of such cases from state to federal court.84 Almost simultane-
ously, while clearly small by contemporary standards, cases raising ques-
tions of nonproprietarian issues under the Bill of Rights became a dis-
cernible part of the Supreme Court's business for the first time.8 5 Ratifi-
78. WIECEK, supra note 41, at 94.
79. See Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-day, 32 HARv. L. REV. 218, 218 (1919).
80. See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 99 (noting that although the federal judiciary was initially
reluctant to use the Fourteenth Amendment to narrow federal authority, it ultimately did so).
81. See id. at 96 (discussing the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), in which
white men used the Fourteenth Amendment to support their argument opposing trade fees imposed
on butchers).
82. See Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
[T]he right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the
natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property
is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its
security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would be-
come a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest la-
bour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social
compact ....
Id.; see also POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS 3, 3-4 (2003) (noting that property rights were
critical because voting rights were often tied to owning property).
83. See Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 310 (finding that deprivation of property with-
out just compensation is "contrary both to the letter and spirit of the Constitution"); PRICE, supra
note 82, at 3-4.
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1, 3, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71.
85. See generally Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (discussing the right of privacy
in U.S. mail under the Fourth Amendment); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878)
(discussing the First Amendment protection of religious freedom); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
394 (1879) (discussing the Bill of Rights as an important feature in determining state versus federal
power); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (analyzing whether the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments allow imprisonment as punishment for being in contempt of court); Ex parte Curtis,
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cation of the Fourteenth Amendment also reopened the federalism-
rattling question of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states.
86
Despite an invigorated docket, with the arrival of such novel issues
alongside the standard judicial fare, the organization of the federal courts
during the 1870s and 1880s remained as it had been in 1800, with the
exceptions of the addition of separate circuit judges and the reduction
(but not elimination) of the Justices' circuit-riding duties.87 The Waite
Court remained the sole court of appeal for most cases from the federal
courts. 88 This was a painful fact because the number of such cases was
surging.89
The first steps toward relief came in 1891, three years after Waite's
death (if any Chief Justice can be said to have died from overwork, it
was Waite). For all but the most stubborn congressional holdouts, the
Waite Court had demonstrated how anachronistic the classical organiza-
tion of the federal courts had become.90 The system was breaking down
under the strain. Too many cases qualified for the Supreme Court's atten-
tion and taxed the collective abilities of nine men to do their work in a
timely fashion.9' "The plan of providing some intermediate courts having
final appellate jurisdiction of certain classes of questions and cases has, I
think, received a more general approval from the bench and bar of the
country than any other," declared President Benjamin Harrison in his
first annual message to Congress in 1889.92 "Without attempting to dis-
cuss details, I recommend that provision be made for the establishment
of such courts."
93
Congress responded in 1891 with the Circuit Court of Appeals
Act.94 In at least three ways, the statute-passed 101 years after the Su-
preme Court's first session-radically broke with the classical tradition.
First, it created a layer of intermediate appellate courts-the circuit
courts of appeals.95 For the first time, for most cases in federal court, the
106 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1882) (considering the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting federal
employees from receiving monies for political purposes from other government employees); Hur-
tado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1884) (considering whether a defendant has a right to a
grand jury in a trial for felony murder punishable by death, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-36 (1886) (considering the right
against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment).
86. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 519-20.
87. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 74.
88. See id. at 76.
89. Id. at 60 (noting that by 1890, the Supreme Court docket was at approximately 1,800
cases, up from 253 in 1850).
90. See id. at 96-97 (discussing concern about the Supreme Court's overwhelming docket).
91. See id. at 60.
92. Benjamin Harrison, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1889), in 12 A COMPILATION OF
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 5467, 5477-78 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
93. Id. at 5478.
94. ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
95. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 98.
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first point of appeal would not be to the United States Supreme Court.
The old circuit courts were soon merged with the district courts, and the
latter became the primary federal trial courts. Second, for certain catego-
ries of cases, the circuit courts of appeals would ordinarily be the courts
of last resort.96 Those cases could reach the Supreme Court only by certi-
fication or certiorari.97 The effects of the 1891 legislation were nearly
instantaneous. In Waite's last term, 482 new cases had been docketed, a
number that grew to 623 new cases in 1890, after Melville Fuller had
become Chief Justice.98 In 1891, with the new law in effect only a few
months, new cases dropped to 379, and then to 275 in 1892.99 The statute
also eliminated circuit riding by the Justices, although each Justice re-
tained certain circuit responsibilities.°° The 1891 Act was only a begin-
ning, of course, toward the contemporary federal judicial system-but it
was a crucially important beginning. The Supreme Court began to move
toward a day when, for the most part, it decided only those questions that
the Justices considered worthy of their time.
Viewed alongside these developments, the Waite Court was truly
part classical and part modem. Organizationally, the Waite Court had far
more in common with the Marshall Court (1801-1835) than with the
Fuller Court (1888-1910) that succeeded it. Granted, Waite era Justices
had to do less circuit riding than did most of their predecessors, but the
country was also larger.' 0 t At least Waite and his colleagues could travel
by rail from state to state, in Pullman palace cars no less, instead of on
horseback, by stagecoach, or by canal and riverboat. 102 The fact remained
that the Supreme Court possessed virtually no control over its docket.
The notion of meriting Supreme Court review was under discussion, but
its realization lay in the future.
Regarding jurisdiction, the Waite Court had more in common with
the Fuller and later Courts than with any Court that preceded it. Looming
over everything were the Reconstruction amendments, especially the
Fourteenth, which with their implementing statutes, vastly expanded the
kinds of cases the Supreme Court might hear.10 3 Perhaps not one of the
subsequent twelve amendments to the Constitution, from the Sixteenth
96. Id. at 99.
97. Id. at 99 n.195; § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
98. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 54, at 101-02.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 78 n.100; see also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 10-11 (1973).
101. Sixteen states entered the Union between 1845 and 1889. D. GRIER STEPHENSON JR., ET
AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 43 tbl.2.6 (1988) [hereinafter AMERICAN GOVERNMENT].
102. See generally FRANK, supra note 68, at 275-91 (describing some of Justice Peter Daniel's
travel experiences on the circuit prior to the Civil War).
103. ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 328-334, 346-349 (7th ed. 1991). The Reconstruction amendments (the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) were ratified in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. See supra notes 75-77
and accompanying text.
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through the Twenty-Seventh, has so affected the business of federal
courts. 1°4 Moreover, given the nature of those amendments, cases arising
under them typically involved a claim by an individual or a business en-
terprise that constitutional rights had been violated. 10 5 In Waite's day,
there were not only more people, but more laws that affected them.'
°6
Indeed, Waite was Chief Justice at the same time that the volume of gov-
ernment regulations, particularly at the state level, was increasing dra-
matically. 10 7 True, as noted, claims were frequently associated with prop-
erty, but they were nonetheless claims based on an individual right.
Moreover, the Waite docket had its share of juror and voting rights cases
that went to the heart of the question regarding those whom the Constitu-
tion had admitted to the political community-those to be counted
among "We the People . . . ." Thus, in the Waite Court, one finds the
earliest signs of a "rights culture" developing, where Americans would
routinely look to the judiciary to both vindicate and sustain their liber-
ties. 108
II. THE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877
Less than three years after Waite's Chief Justiceship began, five
members of his bench were caught up in a political quagmire of major
proportions: the disputed presidential election of 1876.1°9 This would be
the first of three constitutional crises that the United States endured be-
tween the end of the Civil War in 1865, and the extended and fiercely
contested presidential election of 2000.'10 In each one, Justices of the
Supreme Court were key players. Each demonstrated that, while the
Court has always made a pretense of being removed from politics, it is
truly never very far removed from the political arena.11' Although the
separate institutions mandated by the Constitution have made judicial
independence possible, its shared powers long ago allowed the Court to
become a partner in governing the nation.
In 1974, the Supreme Court virtually dictated President Richard M.
Nixon's departure from office-the only instance in American history
104. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 101, at 48.
105. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-126 (1876).
106. See THOMAS H. JOHNSON, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 645 (1966)
(noting that the population of the United States grew at a rate of about thirty percent per decade
between 1790 and 1910).
107. See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 1-45 (1950); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY
(2002).
108. See generally Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
109. Paul Finkleman, The Compromise of 1877, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY 97, 97-98 (Paul Finkleman & Peter Wallenstein eds., 2001).
110. The other two were the court-packing episode of 1937 and the Watergate affair that re-
sulted in the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974. See O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at
246-53.
111. O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at xiii.
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when a president has stepped down during his term.' 12 In United States v.
Nixon,' 3 the Court held that the President, against a claim of executive
privilege, was obliged to hand over certain documents and sound re-
cordings to a court in the District of Columbia for use as evidence.' 14 The
documents and recordings in turn amounted to the proverbial "smoking
gun" that revealed the President's complicity in a two year cover-up of
illegality.' 15 The President thus had a choice between vacating the White
House voluntarily, or facing certain impeachment by the House of Rep-
resentatives and near-certain conviction, and therefore, removal from
office by the Senate."
16
In 1937, by contrast, the judiciary was on the presidential griddle. It
was the Court's own unprecedented obstinacy during 1935 and 1936, in
reaction to major economic reforms in the midst of the Great Depression,
which prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt's equally unprece-
dented assault on the structure and composition of the Supreme Court. 
117
President Roosevelt lost the Court-packing battle, but, because he se-
cured an administration-friendly bench, he won the war. 1
8
In contrast to the crises of 1974 and 1937, however, the Court, as an
institution, was not a participant in the 1876 election. No decision ren-
dered by the highest court in the land decided that election. Instead, the
Court was indirectly entangled because five Justices accepted appoint-
ment as members of a fifteen person commission established by Con-
gress to resolve disputes over contested returns.119 Indeed, one of the five
Justices sat in place of another who had been expected to serve. 120 Thus,
six members of the Waite Court were connected in one way or another
with the commission. Moreover, one former Justice, two future members
of the Waite Court, and the older brother of a sitting Justice had roles in
the drama that unfolded as the United States, barely twelve years re-
moved from a war among the states that had claimed hundreds of thou-
sands of lives, found itself again on the brink of civil strife.
12 1
112. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 333.
113. 418 U.S. 683, 713-14 (1974).
114. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713-14.
115. O'BRIEN, supra note 33, at 246-49, 252-53.
116. See id. at 248, 253.
117. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 194-195 (1941).
118. Id. at 195-96.
119. Finkleman, supra note 109, at 98.
120. See id.
121. See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 289, 292-95 (highlighting the controversy surrounding the
1876 election); see also CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 270-
275 (Archon Books 1963) (1930). The former Justice was John A. Campbell; the two future Justices
were Stanley Matthews and L. Q. C. Lamar; the older brother was David Dudley Field. SWISHER,
supra; see also Arnold M. Paul, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1431, 1439 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
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The election of 1876 was the third in the country's relatively short
history in which the routine presidential electoral machinery failed to
produce a winner. The first two arose when no candidate received a ma-
jority of electoral votes, as Article II and the Twelfth Amendment re-
quire. 1 22 Not anticipating the formation of national political parties, the
framers of the Constitution required presidential electors to cast two
votes for president. 23 The one who received a majority of the votes
would be president, and the runner-up would be vice president. The elec-
tion of 1800 yielded a tie between top electoral vote recipients Thomas
Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both of them Democratic-Republicans.
124
There were more Democratic-Republican than Federalist electors, and all
seventy-three of the former uniformly, if unwisely, cast their votes for
Jefferson and Burr. 125 Pursuant to the Constitution, the House of Repre-
sentatives then performed its backup function and, with each state's
delegation casting one vote as the Constitution mandated, elected Jeffer-
son as the third president. 126 To greatly reduce the possibility of another
tie vote for president, and to take account of the rise of the political par-
ties, Jefferson promptly secured ratification of the Twelfth Amendment
(1804), which required electors to cast separate votes for president and
vice president.
127
Again, in the election of 1824, no candidate received a majority of
the electoral vote. 128 If the failure of the election of 1800 occurred be-
cause of the advent of the party system, the election of 1824 yielded no
winner because of its virtual collapse. Jefferson's party had so thor-
oughly decimated the Federalists as a national political force, that they
had not fielded a presidential candidate since 1816.129 Without competi-
tion between two parties, factions emerged within the only party that
remained. 130 The electoral vote was badly split: ninety-nine for Andrew
Jackson, eighty-four for John Quincy Adams, forty-one for William
Crawford, and thirty-seven for Henry Clay. 13' Again acting in its backup
mode, because no contender had an electoral vote majority, the House
elected Adams as the sixth president.132 The outcome was doubly diffi-
cult for Jackson and his followers to swallow. Not only had he enjoyed a
plurality of electoral votes, but a plurality (41.3 percent) of popular votes
122. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2; Id. amend. XU1. As explained in this and the following
paragraph, the first two occasions in which the routine presidential electoral machinery failed to
produce a winner were the elections of 1800 and 1824.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2.
124. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME




128. Id. at 55.
129. Id. at 54.
130. Id. at 54-55.
131. Id. at 244.
132. Id. at 55.
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as well. 133 However, it was the vote in the House, not the vote in the pre-
cincts, that mattered.
The election of 1876 posed an altogether different predicament, one
for which the elections of 1800 and 1824 offered no obvious solution. "I
think the result of the election is more uncertain than I have felt it to be
for twelve years," Justice Miller wrote to William Ballinger, his brother-
in-law, in July of the election year. 134 "There is enough of opposition to
the Administration, perhaps enough to the Republican party, to defeat the
latter if it could be combined. But the folly of the opposition has saved us
before and will probably do it again."' 35 When the votes were counted
months later, Miller's prediction was as right as it was wrong.
In the race against Ohio Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, Democrat
Samuel J. Tilden of New York comfortably won the popular vote, with
an edge of about 250,000 votes, out of over eight million votes cast.
136
That statistic surely pleased Democrats: it was the first presidential elec-
tion since 1856 in which they out-polled the Republicans, and the first
since 1852 in which the party received at least fifty percent of the vote.'
37
Their euphoria, however, was tempered by one sobering fact. Although
Tilden seemed certain of 184 electoral votes to Hayes's 165, twenty elec-
toral votes remained in play because of disputed returns from Florida,
Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina. 38 From that pool of twenty
votes, Tilden needed only one vote to reach the minimum majority of
185, and thus the White House. To reach the same magic number, Hayes
required all twenty votes. Democrats were acutely aware of the fact that
in three of those states, Hayes's hopes rested on the legitimacy of actions
taken by local canvassing officials, who were themselves part of the Re-
construction governments that Republican congressional majorities had
imposed on a vanquished South. 3 9
Of the four state controversies, South Carolina's seemed most en-
couraging for Hayes. Although Hayes's electors had received a majority
of the popular vote, Democrats claimed that the election results were
tainted, in part because of failure to comply with a state constitutional
requirement for voter registration and in part because of the intimidating
presence of federal troops. 140 By their reasoning, the state had not legiti-
133. Id. at 244.
134. CHARLES FAiRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 282
(1939).
135. Id.
136. STEPHENSON, supra note 124, at 246.
137. 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 651-657 (John L. Moore et
al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
138. Id. at 740.
139. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 275-277.
140. FAtRMAN, supra note 134, at 283.
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mately appointed electors because the federal troops made it impossible
to know the will of the people with accuracy.
41
Oregon's situation was problematical for both Hayes and Tilden. As
in South Carolina, Oregon's three Republican electors garnered more
votes than Tilden's, but one of the three was a postmaster at the time of
the election, and so was constitutionally ineligible to be an elector. After
he resigned his postal job, the Oregon Secretary of State, a Republican,
officially certified him and the other two Republican electors, and au-
thorized them to cast Oregon's electoral votes. 142 The state's Democrat
governor then declared two Republicans, and one Democrat, as the duly
chosen electors, on the theory that the postmaster's resignation could not
make valid what had been invalid on election day.14 3 Complicating mat-
ters further was a state law that allowed a vacancy among electors to be
filled by the remaining electors. 144 The result was a pair of competing
returns. One set awarded three votes to Hayes; this number included the
vote cast by the now ex-postmaster. 45 The other awarded two votes to
Hayes and one to Tilden.
1 6
The situations in Louisiana and Florida were considerably more
convoluted. There were allegations of voter fraud in Louisiana, and white
Democrats in both states had frightened off unknown numbers of black
Republicans from the polls. 47 With the voter canvassing boards in both
states in Republican hands, returns from selected precincts were ex-
cluded, and the election was certified for the Hayes electors. 48 Believing
that victory had been snatched from their hands, Democrats insisted that
the Louisiana and Florida electoral votes belonged instead to Tilden .
49
The Twelfth Amendment specified that electors were to meet in
their respective states to cast votes for president and vice president, and
then to transmit those votes to the president of the Senate-the vice
president, who was then a Republican. 50 In the presence of both the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives, the president of the Senate was to
open the certificates of election "and the votes shall then be counted...
19151 However, the Constitution did not address what was to be done
when rival sets of returns claimed to be "the votes.' 52 Nor was it clear
141. Id.; see Charles Fairman, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, in 7 THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 117-
118 (Supp., Paul A. Freund et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES].
142. FAtMAN, supra note 134, at 283-284.
143. See id.; see also Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 43.
144. See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 284.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 283; Finkleman, supra note 109, at 97.
148. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 284.
149. Finkleman, supra note 109, at 98.





whether the president of the Senate was the one who did the actual
counting and thus, presumably, separated valid from invalid votes. 
153
Had one or the other party been in full control of Congress, the dis-pute retms ould• •154
puted returns would probably not have generated a crisis. A Democrat
majority in the House and Senate would no doubt have accepted some
returns for Tilden; after all, only one electoral vote stood between him
and the White House. A Republican majority in the House and Senate
would no doubt have uniformly accepted votes for Hayes, thus handing
the White House to him. However, control of Congress was split: De-
mocrats held a majority in the House, and Republicans held a majority in
the Senate.155 It was therefore highly improbable that a majority of both
houses would vote to accept the same set of returns.
With no obvious solution to this conundrum, both houses of Con-
gress created special committees to investigate the controversies and to
make recommendations. 156 In January, a consensus emerged between
them that a special commission be established to weigh the conflicting
claims and to report to a joint session of Congress. 157 The majority posi-
tion of the tribunal in turn would determine the fate of the twenty elec-
toral votes unless at least five senators and five representatives objected,
and each house, meeting separately, agreed to reject the findings of the
tribunal. 158
The commission idea became a reality on January 29, 1877, when
President Grant signed into law a bill creating a tribunal. 159 Five of its
members, or commissioners (three Democrats and two Republicans),
would come from the House of Representatives and five (three Republi-
cans and two Democrats) from the Senate. 160 The remaining five would
consist of Justices of the Supreme Court, including two Democrats (Clif-
ford and Field 16 1-the Court's only professed members of the party of
153. See id.
154. See generally L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L.
REV. 321, 331-34 (1961).
155. The Forty-Fifth Congress would not convene until after March 4, 1877. See SWISHER,
supra note 121, at 272. The current practice, whereby the terms of members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives begin in January, is a function of the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in
1933. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX. Thus, it was the balance between the parties in the Forty-Fourth
Congress that mattered. See generally D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Chief Justice as Leader: The
Case ofMorrison Remick Waite, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899 (1973).
156. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 270.
157. See generally id. at 270-73.
158. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 229; see also KELLY ET AL., supra note
103, at 351.
159. 19 Stat. at 227.
160. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 350-51.
161. See DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 84-85 (1998). Field was the only
Democrat that Lincoln named to the Supreme Court, and the seat Field filled was case-driven. Id. at
88-89. Between February 10 and 25, 1863, the Justices heard arguments in the Prize Cases. Id. at 84.
Involving captured ships and their cargos, these challenged the legality of the Union blockade of
Confederate ports. Id. at 104. If southerners were engaged only in insurrection, the blockade would
be illegal under international law. Id. at 105. Declaring the hostilities to be war in a legal sense
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Jackson) and two Republicans (Miller and Strong). 162 These four Justices
in turn were to select a fifth, the expectation being that they would agree
on Justice David Davis who had once been a staunch Republican (and
also Lincoln's campaign manager in the election of 1860163), but whose
recent vacillations left all unsure about his party loyalties.164 This ar-
rangement thus provided for seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and
one presumed independent. All seemed to be counting on Davis to
"maintain the tribunal's equipoise," as the secretary to the House's spe-
cial committee later recorded. 65 "In the ponderous Illinois jurist were
centered the hopes of Democracy, the apprehensions of Republican-
ism.' ' 166 As senior Justice, Clifford would chair the commission. 167 The
statute thus reflected both the widespread conviction that a way out of
the morass had to be found quickly, as well as the confidence of each
party that the chosen device would work to its advantage. Moreover,
inclusion of members of the Supreme Court suggested a belief that the
Justices would not be swayed by the partisanship that was expected to
dictate the votes of the congressional membership; yet the struggle
within Congress about the composition of the judicial component sug-
gested that they would.
would legitimize the blockade but would confer recognition on the Confederacy as a nation. Id. at
104. Other countries would then be free to recognize it as such. l. Moreover, the blockade had
begun in April 1861, but had not been formally approved by Congress in July. Id. What was the
status of seizures in the interim? In a large sense the Republican theory of the war and the Union
seemed to hang in the balance. See generally id. at 104-08. By a one-vote margin on March 10, the
Court sustained both the blockade and the administration's theory of a de facto war. See generally
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
Understandably, concern pervaded the administration and Congress, even prior to this close
call that the Court had to be made firmly "safe" for the Union. See SILVER, supra, at 86. Not coinci-
dentally a bill was introduced in the Senate on February 20, to provide for a new circuit consisting of
California and Oregon and to add a ninth associate Justice to the Supreme Court. Id. at 84-85. Lin-
coln signed the measure into law on March 3, seven days before the decision in the Prize Cases was
announced. Id. at 85. At one level, the legislation was a warning to the bench that its size and juris-
diction, perhaps even its existence, lay in Congress's hands. Id. At another level, the legislation
recognized the importance of cementing the Pacific coast states into the Union, particularly in light
of the fact that 1862 had been another dismal year for northern generals on the battlefield. Id. at 88.
For Lincoln, Field, who was Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, no doubt seemed
the obvious choice for the ninth seat. See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY
FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 11, 2, 10 (1997). "A forty-niner, not a miner," Field was
a Democrat, but was loyal to the Union; that was an important consideration in a divided nation and
in a state where Democrats from southern states comprised a vocal minority. See SILVER, supra, at
91. When the transcontinental telegraph line transmitted its first dots and dashes in October 1861,
one of its "first messages" was one from Chief Justice Field to President Lincoln expressing the
loyalty of Californians to the Union. Id. at 89. Moreover, Field enjoyed near unanimous endorsement
from those who mattered in California politics, including its congressional delegation and Governor
(and aspiring railroad baron) Leland Stanford. Id. at 91. Besides, he would bring valuable expertise
to Washington. As much as anyone, Field understood the complex land title cases so prevalent in the
state. Id. at 89.
162. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 271.
163. See generally WILLIARD L. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER: DAVID DAVIS 143-61 (1960).
164. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 271.
165. Milton Harlow Northrup, A Grave Crisis in American History, 62 CENTURY MAGAZINE
923, 926 (May-Oct. 1901).
166. Id. at 933.
167. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 271.
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Expectations about Davis promptly went awry. Practically on the
eve of the congressional vote establishing the commission, William P.
Pelton, Tilden's nephew, colluded with Democrats in the Illinois legisla-
ture to engineer Davis's election to the United States Senate. 68 Presuma-
bly, the thinking was that Davis, out of gratitude to Democrats, would
then be obliged to favor Tilden over Hayes. Neither Tilden nor congres-
sional Democrats, however, seem to have had any forewarning of this
scheme. "Thunder out of a clear sky could not more thoroughly have
startled the Democratic leaders in Washington., 169 The intrigue back-
fired. Davis announced his resignation from the Court to take effect on
March 4, 1877, whereupon he would be sworn in as a senator. 170 In the
meanwhile, as a senator-elect, Davis could hardly sit as a judicial mem-
ber of the electoral tribunal. The four judicial members of the commis-
sion then named Justice Bradley to take Davis's place. 171 Long a Repub-
lican, Bradley nonetheless was not an outspoken partisan. His political
involvement over the years had been minimal, consisting of a single (and
unsuccessful) campaign for a congressional seat in 1862.172 Nonetheless,
the expectation that Davis would be the fifth judicial member had helped
convince congressional Democrats to accept the commission plan.
Moreover, the timing of Davis's exit, coming as it did at such a late date,
meant that the process had gone too far and gained too much momentum
for Democrats to back out.
The commission met between January 31 and March 2, hearing ar-
guments and testimony in the old Senate chamber, now quarters for the
Supreme Court. 173 Able counsel did battle for both sides. Among those
whom the Democrats deployed were former Justice John A. Campbell,
former Attorney General Jeremiah Black, and David Dudley Field,
brother of Justice Field. 174 The Republican team included future Justice
Stanley Matthews.175 Another future Justice, L.Q.C. Lamar, was the
member of the House of Representatives who officially nominated the
five House members, who had each been chosen by their respective cau-
cuses. 176 Shortly thereafter, he would have much to do with achieving the
Democrats' acquiescence in Hayes's election, and, through negotiations
that led to the removal of the last federal troops from the South, with the
formal end of Reconstruction. 
177
168. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3; id. amend. XVI. Prior to ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment (1913), which mandated popular election of U.S. Senators, state legislatures elected
U.S. Senators.
169. Northrup, supra note 165, at 933.
170. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 272.
171. Id.
172. See SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 203.
173. Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 56-57.
174. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 285-86, 288.
175. Id. at 288.
176. Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 54.
177. See Paul, supra note 121, at 1439-440.
2003]
470 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
In resolving the disputes from Louisiana and Florida especially, the
commission's initial task was to decide whether it would look "behind"
the officially certified election returns. 178 Democrats argued that the offi-
cial tallying of electoral votes in the presence of Congress made no sense
if Congress could not be assured of the integrity of the votes.179 The
question was critical and had not been answered by the statute setting up
the commission.1 80 If the tribunal made its own independent assessment
of the validity of the returns, it would then have to consider ample evi-
dence of voter intimidation and fraud, as well as the discounting of De-
mocratic ballots.1 81 Under that broader mission, some of the electoral
votes might be awarded to Tilden. This step would have been devastating
for Republicans because of the ever-present reality that Hayes needed all
contested votes to win. On the other hand, if the commission decided it
could not look behind the returns, then its role would encompass little
more than assuring that the certifications had been presented in the
proper form. Republicans argued that going behind the election returns
would place Congress in the unprecedented position of second-guessing
state canvassing officials. 182 They pointed to the specter of Congress's
routinely making and unmaking election results from the states. 83 So
circumscribed a role would probably validate the Hayes electors. On this
and all other substantively important questions, members of the commis-
sion, including Justice Bradley, voted precisely according to party affilia-
tion, accepting the Hayes electors from Louisiana and Florida by a vote
of eight to seven.
184
By parity of this reasoning, Democrats hoped to prevail in the Ore-
gon dispute. If so, they would pick up the necessary and sufficient single
electoral vote for Tilden. The state's governor (a Democrat) had certified
that one Democratic and two Republican electors had been chosen.
185
The argument that reaped electors for Hayes in Florida and Louisiana
favored Tilden in Oregon. 86 If the commission was not to look behind
the official returns, Hayes seemed to face certain defeat. Stanley Mat-
thews and lead Republican counsel William Evarts, however, managed
to turn matters to the Grand Old Party's advantage. State law made the
secretary of state (a Republican) the official canvassing authority.187 Re-
fusal by the governor to sign that certificate of election did not undercut
the validity of the conclusion of the canvassing authority. 188 Members of
178. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 289.
179. See SWISHER, supra note 121, at 277.
180. See ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227.
181. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 275.
182. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 289.
183. Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 65.
184. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 277.





the commission, again voting by party, decided eight to seven that the
secretary of state, not the governor, spoke for the people of the state. 189
By the same margin, the commissioners accepted the Hayes electors
from South Carolina, in the last of the four cases they considered.' 90
Amazingly, with Oregon perhaps excepted, each side had effec-
tively switched doctrinal position, reversing entrenched political views
that had defined a principal difference between the parties since 1856.
Democrats professed high nationalism, insisting on intervention by a
federal authority into elections conducted by the states. Republicans ar-
gued for the sanctity of state's rights and congressional deference to state
officials. As Justice Miller remarked eleven years later at a dinner at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, "To permit Congress to deter-
mine the vote would have resulted in the destruction of the Government.
That body never acts judicially. It would be like their determination upon
the rights to seats which are invariably decided in favor of those in sym-
pathy with the majority."'
191
The commission's rulings that favored Republican electors in each
state made it virtually certain that Hayes, not Tilden, would be the nine-
teenth president. The Republican Senate accepted the verdicts, and the
Democratic House of Representatives rejected them. Under the terms of
the statute that created the commission, the commission's judgments
were to stand, unless a majority in both houses voted to discard them.
March 4, the usual inauguration day, fell on a Sunday in 1877.
Hayes, therefore, privately took the oath of office on March 3, and the
public inauguration occurred on Monday, March 5. "I am just returned
from the . . . ceremonies," Justice Miller wrote his brother-in-law Wil-
liam P. Ballinger in Texas, "and the cannon are peacefully playing the
last part in that drama. It is to me a great relief. ,,.9' In Miller's mind,
the "peaceful inauguration of Hayes ... [was] due largely, very largely,
to the discretion, forbearance, good sense and patriotism of the southern
leaders of the democratic party."'' 93 Miller specifically cited the contribu-
tions of L.Q.C. Lamar, among three others.
If Miller was relieved, Bradley was anguished. More than any of the
five Justices on the commission, he incurred the greatest personal cost.
As he wrote a year later, he had endured "immense gratuitous and un-
founded abuse."' 94 Although all fifteen members had taken the same oath
"impartially [to] examine and consider. . . and a true judgment give," no
189. Id. at 117.
190. Id. at 119.
191. SAMUEL WHrrAKER PENNYPACKER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PENNSYLVANIAN 132
(John C. Winston Co. 1918) (1917).
192. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 291.
193. Id.
194. Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 123 (internal quotations omit-
ted).
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one seemed surprised (although many were decidedly unhappy) that
fourteen voted by party. 195 Bradley, the fifteenth member, was therefore
in a unique and impossible position: both sides expected him to act im-
partially on their behalf. However, if unhappy Democrats aimed most of
their invective at Bradley, they saved some for Miller and Strong too.
When the three were hung in effigy in Monticello, New York, Bradley's
likeness was positioned in the center and bore this inscription: "I am cru-
cified between two thieves."'
196
The outcome was costly to the Court as well. Although the Court
had not acted institutionally with respect to the electoral commission,
participation by five of its members rekindled images of "that bitter and
unscrupulous spirit of faction with which the politics of our day threatens
to taint the judiciary."'1 97 Reflecting the consensus among Democrats that
they had been duped into accepting the electoral commission as a way
out of the election dispute, Field and Clifford conspicuously absented
themselves from the inauguration of "His fraudulency," as critics had
already begun to call the nineteenth president. 198 One newspaper with
Democratic leanings praised them for having a sense of propriety, but
added that they would have served their country better had they refused
appointment to the electoral commission. 199 A Republican paper decried
their absence as "an act of discourtesy as discreditable and unworthy as it
was uncalled for and undignified. The only explanation ... is that, not
being able to forget that they were Democrats, they were unable to re-
member that they were justices.,, 200 Never one to keep opinions to him-
self, Field was believed to have started a rumor that Bradley changed his
mind at the last minute on critical issues, after being visited by influential
Republican leaders and railroad magnates. 20 Bradley demanded that
Field prove the accusation or retract it.202 Field insisted that he had been
misquoted and misunderstood.2 3 Hard feelings between the two per-
sisted.2 °4 Moreover, the experience steeled Clifford to remain on the
bench, incapacitated or not, until a Democrat again occupied the White
House. While Garfield's election in 1880 made that hope impossible to
realize, Clifford's mental deterioration soon posed a serious problem for
Chief Justice Waite. With other members of the bench suffering various
195. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
196. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 278 (internal quotations omitted).
197. The Week, THE NATION, July 23, 1881, at 62.
198. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 98 (1995).
199. SWISHER, supra note 121, at 281.
200. Id. at 281-82 (internal quotations omitted).
201. Id. at 278-79.
202. Id. at 279.
203. Id.
204. See id.; see also Fairman, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 141, at 135-36.
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infirmities, a smaller number of Justices were left to shoulder an increas-
ingly burdensome caseload.2 °5
As distasteful as each man must have found the final resolution of
the election of 1876, Field and Clifford had performed a valuable public
service. As the only two true Democrats on the Court, it seems improb-
able that there would have been an electoral commission had one or both
refused to serve. How the disputed election would then have been re-
solved remains anyone's guess.
Nonetheless, participation by a majority of the bench in resolving
the dispute over electoral votes meant that they (perhaps Bradley alone)
were effectively deciding the identity of the next president. Since 1877,
this has happened only twice: in 1974, when the judicially driven ouster
of Nixon made Vice President Gerald Ford the thirty-eighth president;
and in 2000, when Bush v. Gore20 6 cut short a hastily arranged recount in
Florida and handed the White House to George W. Bush.20 7
Moreover, the Waite Court's part in the electoral debacle of 1876
shaped the Supreme Court. Had the commission not awarded the election
to Hayes, it is highly improbable that either John Marshall Harlan or
William Woods would ever have been appointed to the Supreme Court.
Hayes owed a political debt to Harlan,2 °8 and Tilden assuredly did not.
As for Woods, he was the right Republican, in the right place, at the right
time, for a Republican president who wanted to ease sectional tensions
by elevating a southerner-albeit a recently relocated former Union
Army officer-to the Court for the first time since the Civil War.209 Had
the electoral controversy gone Tilden's way, the withdrawal of federal
troops would surely have proceeded, as it did under Hayes, but there also
would surely have been the nomination of a "real" southerner to the
205. See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 260-61, 266.
206. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
207. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110 (finding that no constitutionally acceptable hand recounting was
possible with voting by the electoral college just days away).
208. See YARBROUGH, supra note 198, at 86-102. This was true for at least two reasons. First,
Harlan, who was both famous and notorious, and whose career generously revealed that he would
rather be right than consistent, had been law partner of Benjamin Bristow, the first U.S. solicitor
general, and Grant's last treasury secretary. Id. at 86-87. Bristow's fight against corruption within his
own department made him a contender for the 1876 Republican presidential nomination, and Harlan
headed the Kentucky delegation at the party's national convention. Id. at 88, 90. Republican regulars
and anti-reform elements supported New York's James Blaine. Id. at 92-93, 95. When it became
apparent that Bristow would lose, Harlan shifted Kentucky's votes to Hayes at a critical moment,
assuring Hayes the nomination. Id. at 95. Hayes was in Harlan's debt, although Bristow and Harlan
soon had a permanent falling out. Id. at 95-96, 102. Second, Hayes, as president in the wake of the
disputed elections of 1876, named Harlan to a commission to determine the legitimate government
in Louisiana. Id. at 100-02. Two governors claimed lawful dominion: there was the carpetbag Re-
publican administration of Stephen Packard and the Democratic administration of Confederate
veteran and amputee Francis Nicholls. Id. Federal troops shored up the former, white voters the
latter. Id. Partly on Harlan's recommendation, Hayes abandoned Packard, and withdrew the army.
Id. Harlan thus enabled Hayes to defuse a crisis in the first months of his presidency. Id.
209. See generally Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., Yankee from Georgia: A Search for Justice Woods,
in SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 31, 31-36 (1978).
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Court, well prior to Grover Cleveland's selection of L.Q.C. Lamar in the
twilight of the Waite years.2t °
III. WAITE AS COURT LEADER
Morrison Waite was the last person commissioned as "chief justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States.",211 Beginning with Melville
Fuller, all successive commissions for the occupant of the Court's center
chair have read "chief justice of the United States. 212 That change in
wording in 1888 was symbolic of the national stature that the office had
acquired, but it was also prophetic. Beginning in 1922, every Chief Jus-
tice, working through the Judicial Conference of the United States, has
been the administrative head of the entire federal court system, a third-
branch chieftain.21 3 Given the caseload that swamped his Court, it is just
as well that Waite was not saddled with that larger oversight responsibil-
ity. Instead, his responsibilities were similar to those shouldered by the
six Chiefs who preceded him: he was administrative head of the Supreme
Court and its presiding officer.2 14 Any influence over other federal
courts, outside of the Fourth Circuit (to which Chiefs have traditionally
been assigned), was informal at most and occasional at best.2 15
In a formal sense, all Chief Justices, Waite included, have been
primus inter pares-first among equals.21 6 With the post's supervisory
duties has always come a modest differential in salary, but the Chief Jus-
tice is officially "in charge" with respect to the associate Justices only in
a very limited sense. 1 7 While the Chief traditionally is the one who con-
trols the assignment of opinions, even that power applies only when he is
in the majority. 1 8 Moreover, his vote in deciding cases is worth no more
than the vote of any of the associate Justices.2 19 Similarly, the associate
Justices are not accountable to the Chief Justice. 220 They do not "work"
for him. There is no chain of command on the bench. The relationship
between Chief Justice and associate Justice is not the relationship that
exists between the president and a member of the cabinet. Associate Jus-
tices do not serve at the pleasure of their Chief. Thus, the lines of author-
ity that might otherwise assure a smoothly functioning military unit,
business, or other organization are missing at the Supreme Court. The
210. Daniel J. Meador, Lamar to the Court: Last Step to National Reunion, in SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 27, 27,41, 44 (1986).
211. Peter Graham Fish, Chief Justice, Office of the, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 140, 141 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
212. Id.
213. FISH, supra note 100, at 32-33.
214. Fish, supra note 211, at 141.
215. See generally id.
216. Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, 17 J.
PUB. L. 20, 21 (1968).
217. Fish, supra note 211, at 140-41.





Supreme Court is no well-oiled machine, but rather seems to consist of
nine little law firms where each Justice "is his own sovereign. 22' A right
to preside does not carry with it a right to prevail. Nor does it entitle a
Chief to exercise influence over "his" Court. A Chief Justice may reign
without also ruling. "Being Chief Justice," laconically commented Jus-
tice Harlan F. Stone after observing Taft at work for five years, "is a
good deal like being Dean of the law school-he has to do the things the
janitor will not do.,
222
Nonetheless, even without the usual accouterments of power, some
Chief Justices have been known as Court leaders.223 The name of John
Marshall immediately stands out. For a variety of reasons, some of which
were unique to his day, Marshall dominated his Court like no other Chief
Justice.224 It was indisputably his Court in fact as well as in name.225 To
what degree was the Supreme Court between 1874 and 1888 truly the
Waite Court? Is the name suggestive of real impact and influence, or
does it remain a mere linguistic convenience?
A path-breaking paper written over four decades ago (and since re-
printed in several anthologies on judicial behavior) applied the concept
of small group leadership functions, specifically "task" and "social"
leadership, to the Chief Justice.226 From this perspective, a task leader is
one who presents his views with force and clarity, defends them success-
fully in discussion with colleagues, provides guidance for handling per-
plexing situations, and assumes responsibility for orienting conference227
deliberations and writing opinions. Someone who excels in social
leadership relieves tensions, encourages solidarity and agreement, at-
tends to the emotional needs of colleagues, and is often the best-liked
member of the bench.228 This conception of leadership confirms "the
common sense observation that a man who wishes to exert influence
over his fellows can do so most effectually if he is both intellectually
disciplined and tactful in interpersonal relations. 229
221. Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 901 (1953).
222. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 281 (1956).
223. Fish, supra note 211, at 140-41 (listing the limited powers of the Chief Justice, while at
the same time highlighting some great accomplishments that have been made from the position).
224. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 524, 526 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
225. Id.; HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at
12 (1997) (stating that Chief Justice Marshall "exerts as much charm posthumously over biographers
as he did over his contemporaries in life").
226. David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in
COURTS, JUDGES, & POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 662, 663 (Walter F.
Murphy et al. eds., 5th ed. 2002).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Walter F. Murphy, Marshaling the Court: Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial
Process, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 640, 642 (1962). Of course the same "common sense observation"
would apply to a woman as well.
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Inhering in the idea of task leadership, however, are two distinct
functions: managerial and intellectual leadership.23° Considering these
separately may offer a clearer window into judicial leadership, especially
when a Chief Justice is stronger with respect to one than to the other.23'
"A chief justice as a managerial leader must stay abreast of the docket,
maintain a maximum degree of court unity, provide expeditious direction
of the judicial conference, and assign opinions thoughtfully and with
deliberation. ''232 A Chief Justice as intellectual leader presents his views
persuasively, "is a principal source of ideas and doctrine, and provides
tactical and strategic guidance in political dilemmas. 233 This division
thus allows a probing of three measures of leadership: social, managerial,
and intellectual-a trichotomy that seems especially appropriate in as-
sessing Waite. So judged, Waite excelled at social leadership, performed
adequately as Court manager, and ordinarily looked to others for intellec-
tual leadership.
From the beginning, Waite attempted to fashion the camaraderie
that would be necessary for the Court to function effectively. Waite's
careful handling of the "problem brethren," particularly Field, Clifford,
Hunt, and Swayne, exemplifies his attempts.234 More of a follower than a
leader, Hunt suffered a paralytic stroke in January 1879, but clung to his
seat even though he could do no judicial work.235 The absentee jurist was
a heavy burden for the other brethren to bear. The impasse-Hunt had
not served long enough to qualify for a pension-was not broken until
230. Danielski, supra note 226, at 668.
231. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 900; Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of
Supreme Court Leadership, Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 63, 64 (1991).
232. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 900.
233. Id.
234. Each presented different challenges for institutional collegiality. Field was brilliant but
was also headstrong and easily offended, and sometimes tempestuous. He also possessed "a quite
special capacity both for making enemies and for being one." Robert McCloskey, Stephen J. Field,
in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 1069, 1083 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). Field had highly unrealistic
aspirations for the White House in 1880. After a dispute with Democratic president Grover Cleve-
land, Field claimed, "he would not set foot inside the White House so long as Cleveland remained
president." FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 298. As one contemporary commented, "when Field hates
he hates for keeps." McCloskey, supra, at 1084 (internal quotations omitted).
Clifford's mental decline in the 1870s partly explains why Waite assigned him almost no opin-
ions in constitutional cases. Moreover, most of his opinions were lengthy and almost always ponder-
ously written. As his grandson explained, "He began at the beginning, and marched by careful stages
through every possible phase or contingency. The result was that when he arrived at his conclusion,
there was no point which had not been covered." PHILIP G. CLIFFORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD,
DEMOCRAT, 1803-1881, at 87 (1922). Waite no doubt agreed. As the Chief commented in a letter
about one opinion, "'It will take a good while to find out all there is in it. Bro. Clifford is never very
short."' Letter from Morrison R. Waite to D.T. Wright (Feb. 22, 1877) (on file in Morrison R. Waite
Papers, Library of Congress).
By 1879, Swayne's mental faculties were in decline. "But as the old fox don't want to go,"
wrote Miller, "he readily seizes on the objection, that the business of the court might be suspended to
delay action." FAiRMAN, supra note 134, at 380. Not until President Hayes prevailed upon Swayne
to retire, by assuring him that Swayne's friend and fellow Ohioan Stanley Matthews would have his
seat, did Swayne agree to step down. Id.
235. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 209.
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Senator (and former Justice) David Davis pushed a private bill through
Congress in early 1882 that made Hunt eligible for his pension at full
salary, provided he retire within thirty days.236 Hunt stepped down as
soon as the bill became law,237 demonstrating that the Chief was "sensi-
tive to the benefits which could be derived from relieving interpersonal
tension and supporting fallen egos. '238 He did so without the "judicial
handshake" that his successor Melville Fuller introduced as a device to
maintain harmony.239
Soon after Waite became Chief Justice, the Court, in United States
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,2 40 held that the acts of Congress chartering the
newly constructed western railroads did not require a railroad to pay
semi-annual interest prior to maturity of the government's second mort-
gage bonds. 241 Because the decision was in favor of the company, Waite
assigned the opinion to Davis, then perceived as the member of the
bench least friendly to corporate privilege.242 In fact, at the conference
where the case was decided, the Chief Justice remarked that it would be
best that the opinion not be written by anyone closely identified with the
industry.243 Bradley had come to the Court as an experienced railroad
attorney, but it was no doubt Field whom Waite had in mind because the
Californian was a close friend of Leland Stanford, head of the Central
Pacific. 2" Field-always strong-willed and quick to take offense-
vented his feelings in a note to the Chief Justice.245 "I had no idea that
you specially desired it," Waite gingerly replied, "and when the an-
nouncement was made, supposed you would not fail to see its propri-
,,246ety. Unmoved, Field scratched off a second note, and Waite made a
second attempt to mollify his colleague:
I have just received and read your note of yesterday. I think you
must be mistaken in your understanding of the words I used after the
consultation. If those you give were the words I did use, certainly
they were not used in the offensive sense you appear to have received
them.
236. See id. at 210.
237. Id.
238. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 908.
239. William J. Brennan, Jr., Inside View of the High Court, in CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
154, 158 (Donald R. Cressey ed., 1971). To this day, upon entering the conference room, each Jus-
tice shakes the hand of every other Justice. It remains "a symbol that harmony of aims if not of
views is the Court's guiding principle." Id.
240. 91 U.S. 72 (1875).
241. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. at 79.




246. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen Field (Nov. 7, 1875) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
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We cannot conceal from ourselves the fact, that in the excited
state of feeling which exists, or has existed, with the public in respect
to the connexion of the government with the Union Pacific there may
be some feeling of disappointment at the result of this case. It seems
to me, therefore, to be specially important that the opinion should
come from one who had not only been understood to be watchful of
the government purse, but who would not be known as the personal
friend of the parties representing these rail road interests....
No one appreciates your vigorous style more than I do, and, but
for these considerations I should have been glad to have had its use in
this case .... As for opinions in important cases, I don't know, but I
think you fared better than the Judge [Davis] who has the case did at
the last term. Certainly during the present term he has had no advan-
tage over you. I certainly intend to treat all my brethren fairly in this
most delicate and at the same time important part of my work. If I do
not, it is the fault of the head and not of the heart.
24 7
Waite's second note to Field may not have calmed him entirely, but
there is no evidence in Waite's papers or in other sources that he ever
again challenged his Chief on an opinion assignment.
Clifford posed a different problem for Waite. A carry-over from the
Buchanan administration, and the oldest member of the Court, his mental
abilities weakened noticeably soon after Waite became Chief Justice.248
Clifford, however, was alert enough to sense what others were thinking.
Waite tried on several occasions to assuage the situation. On one occa-
sion, for example, Clifford voted with the majority in a case, was as-
signed to write the opinion, but later returned it to Waite, declining to
write it because he was unprepared.249 Waite wrote the opinion him-
self.250 In a comparable instance, Clifford notified Waite that he was "not
willing to write an opinion in No. 93 and therefore return it. If you want
No. 99 for any of your friends you may have that also. 25 1 Waite replied:
I regret that my assignment of cases to you last evening was not
satisfactory. I gave you 93 because you were familiar with the law of
copyright, and although the case was a simple one, I thought it might
be made the foundation of one of your useful opinions.
247. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Stephen Field (Nov. 10, 1875) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
248. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 910.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Letter from Nathaniel Clifford to Morrison R. Waite (Dec. 25, 1878) (on file in Morrison
R. Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
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If you still think you do not want 93, I will keep it .... I wanted
to give you the two important land cases which Judge Miller has, but
you said expressly in the conference that you did not want them."
252
Confusion between Swayne and Miller, in conference in November
1879, led to a note from the Chief Justice to Swayne-an attempt to
avoid further disagreement with Miller.253 (Not only did Miller consider
Swayne unworthy of the judicial robe, but was willing to say so.) "As I
said in the consultation room," Waite explained to Swayne, "I am en-
tirely satisfied with your opinion. ' 54 Waite then went on:
I think however, Miller had the right to believe from what occurred
when the case was decided, that the point which he suggested yester-
day was not to go into the opinion. While no formal vote was taken
he had good reason to believe his objection was assented to.
I submit to you, therefore, whether, under all the circumstances,
that part of the opinion had better not be left out. You know how im-
portant it is to avoid, as far as possible, all occasion for unpleasant
criticism in our consultations, and if one judge is allowed to write an
opinion on a different ground from that on which the decision was
placed, it is easy to see how difficult it may sometimes be to enforce
the rule as to others.
I hope you will receive this suggestion in the same spirit it is
made....
255
I leave the matter entirely to your own judgment.
Four years earlier, when Swayne complained about the amount of work
he had to do, Waite had tried to accommodate him, even at a sacrifice to
himself.25 6 "It was an imposition to ask you to take the French... case.
Send it back to me and I will write it. I shall have plenty of time this
week.
, 2 57
As such incidents illustrate, opinion assignment can be fraught with
controversy, even as it is one of a Chief Justice's most important func-
tions. How those assignments are administered thus speaks not only to
social leadership, but managerial leadership as well. Waite understood
that the choice of the author of an opinion played a part in maintaining
Court cohesion, and in achieving public acceptance of the ruling.
252. BRUCE R. TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 259
(1938) (quoting Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Nathaniel Clifford (Dec. 25, 1878)).
253. See Stephenson, supra note 155, at 911 n.47.
254. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Noah Swayne (Nov. 8, 1879) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
255. Id.
256. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 911 n.47.
257. TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 265. Waite's comment regarding "plenty of time" must
surely have been facetious.
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In 1881, the Chief Justice compiled for historian George Bancroft a
list of those cases decided since 1874 that Waite thought were of greatest
constitutional significance. 258 Of the seventy-two cases on the list, Waite
was in the majority in all but six. 259 Of those sixty-six, he assigned the
bulk to some of the most intellectually capable members of the bench:
Waite had written fourteen, Field and Miller eleven each, Strong ten,
Bradley seven, and Harlan, the newest member, five. 260 Swayne and
Davis, respRectively, wrote four and two, and Clifford and Hunt each had
only one. 1 By authoring a plurality of the important cases, Waite
seemed to be suggesting both to his colleagues and to the public that a
Chief Justice ought to write the greater number of opinions. This he rou-
tinely did across most categories of cases. Many of Waite's opinions,
especially those on jurisdictional matters, may have amounted to little
more than brief statements of fact and law, followed by an order of the
Court, but they represented a clear commitment of time just the same.262
Moreover, Waite made a conscious effort to vote with the majority,
especially in important cases, in order to retain the opinion assignment
power.263 His personal docket books indicate that he sometimes switched
his vote, after conference, so that he would be able to choose the author
of the opinion.2 4 Indeed, Waite was one of the Court's least frequent
dissenters. 265 This pattern of behavior supported what one study has de-
scribed as the norm of consensus, whereby published (that is, public)
dissenting votes were discouraged.266 Waite took pride in unanimity,
once noting in a letter to his wife in 1878 about an unnamed case in
which he had managed to persuade Field and Clifford not to dissent.
267
258. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 263 n.40.
259. Id. at 263.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U.S. 564 (1878); United States v. Hailey, 118 U.S. 233
(1886).
263. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 917.
264. Id.
265. Id..
266. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 362, 362 (2001).
267. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Amelia Waite (May 19, 1878) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress). The actual number of dissenting votes initially cast by Waite
Court Justices was considerably greater than the published record reveals. Epstein et al., supra note
266, at 366. That is, many seemingly unanimous decisions were in fact initially decided with one or
more dissenting votes. Likewise, decisions reporting only one or two dissenters may have been
initially reached with three or four dissenting votes. This is known not merely anecdotally but be-
cause of very precise records that Chief Justice Waite maintained in his docket books that indicate
the vote among the Justices at the conference where the case was decided. Waite's data can then be
compared to data drawn from the Reports. The most thorough study of this phenomenon finds that
dissenting votes at conference were recorded in forty percent of the cases, or about four times the
percentage indicated by the Reports. Id.
In trying to account for such divergence between the conference tally and the Reports, Epstein,
Segal, and Spaeth consider the Waite Court's pattern as part of a trend in judicial behavior during the
past two centuries. Until 1940, the Supreme Court's public dissent rate never exceeded thirty percent
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Managerial leadership also encompasses efficient handling of the
Court's docket. That was an exceedingly difficult goal during the time of
the Waite Court, especially during periods when the bench was under-
staffed. That left more work to be done by the able-bodied (and able-
minded). "I am hard at work but still very well," Waite wrote in 1881.268
"The experience of this fall has satisfied me entirely that six or seven is
less than nine.,, 269 That was soon after Waite appointed a committee con-
sisting of Miller, Swayne, and himself, to see if the workload could be
made more manageable by reducing the length of opinions. 270 However,
as Miller complained in a letter:
[W]e have not been able to suggest any satisfactory remedy.
The truth ... is that the one man of our court who ought to take
the lead and without whose firmness and courage nothing can be
and usually hovered between five and ten percent. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 150-52.
Since 1940 the public dissent rate has rarely been below fifty percent. Id.
Some scholars have argued that the sharp increase in dissents in the modem era is a function of
the Court's increasing control over its docket. That is, in contrast to the situation in Waite's time
when the Court was obliged to decide every case that qualified jurisdictionally, the Court, in a small
step after 1891, and in a giant step after 1925, found itself able to select cases for decision, and to
turn away the rest. The abundance of routine and "easy" cases, therefore, disappeared from the
docket, and "hard" cases, with a greater tendency to provoke disagreement, took their place.
That may explain some of the contrast between the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century and
the last half of the twentieth century, but it does not account for the many instances in which Waite
Court Justices dissented at conference, only later to join with the majority. If the bulk of the late
nineteenth century cases were easy, involving only perfunctory appellate review of correctly decided
cases from courts below, that fact presumably would have been apparent at conference. So, what else
could account for the divergence between the private-public dissent rates among the Waite Court
Justices?
Using various statistical tools, Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth prefer an alternate explanation: a
prevailing norm of consensus that discouraged the public display of a divided bench. A Justice who
indicated disagreement at conference would later typically acquiesce in what the majority decided. It
is that norm, the authors contend, that collapsed in the twentieth century.
An additional factor should be considered as well. The number of cases on the Court's docket
mushroomed during Waite's tenure, due both to congressional expansion of federal jurisdiction and
to economic and social changes underway. By the time of Waite's death, the docket was more than
four years in arrears. This was also at a time when the Justices had practically no support staff. The
Justices truly did their own work. (Justice Gray was the first Justice with a law clerk; in 1882 he
hired a recent law school graduate and paid him out of his own salary. Not until 1922 would Con-
gress appropriate money to provide a clerk for each Justice). Even manual typewriters were not
widely marketed until after Waite's tenure began.
While a growing backlog itself might not discourage dissent, the number of opinions of the
Court that the Justices had to write might. The number of opinions issued rose considerably after the
1878 term, and it was during the five year period preceding 1878 that the rate of public dissents was
highest. EPsTEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 150. More significantly, the first five terms displayed the
highest rate of published dissenting opinions, averaging ten percent. In contrast, during the remain-
ing terms, dissenting opinions were attached to only five percent of majority opinions. EPsTEIN ET
AL., supra note 34, at 150. Then there were the occasions when illness prevented one or more Jus-
tices from shouldering a normal share of opinion writing. Waite, for instance, was absent from the
Court between December 1884 and March 1885 while recuperating in Florida. MAGRATH, supra
note 1, at 272-274. With added work to do because of another's incapacity, a Justice might conclude
that prudence, including a wariness of trying to do too much, advised writing a dissent only in ex-
ceptional circumstances.
268. TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 273.
269. Id.
270. See Stephenson, supra note 155, at 914; see also FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 408-09.
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done is sadly wanting in both those qualities. He is much more anx-
ious to be popular as an amiable, kind hearted man (which he is) than
as the dignified and capable head of the greatest court the world ever
knew.
27 1
Miller's disparaging reference was to the Chief Justice.272
The situation, however, would have been difficult for any Chief,
with or without the infirmities that plagued the Waite bench.273 As noted,
the Court would neither be entirely relieved of circuit-riding duty, nor
enjoy even modest control over its docket until after 1891.274 Instead, the
Justices were expected to spend some part of each year on the circuit,
and were obliged to decide all qualifying cases. With an expanded fed-
eral jurisdiction in the decade after the Civil War, that meant a docket
increasingly in arrears. A backlog of about 600 cases in May of 1876 had
nearly tripled at the time of Waite's death in March of 1888.275 Such
numbers pointed to what Waite himself called an "oppressive wrong.,
276
Speaking at a bar association meeting at the Academy of Music in Phila-
delphia in September 1887, the Chief Justice spelled out the grim reality:
"business is now more than three years and a half behind; that is to say,
that cases entered now, when the term of 1887 is about to begin, are not
likely to be reached in their regular order for hearing until late in the term
of 1890.,,277
Responsibility for relief, Waite made clear, lay with Congress, al-
though neither Waite nor any of his associate Justices shared the enthusi-
asm for lobbying, in which Chief Justice Taft would so handily engage
for the Court's benefit in the 1920s.278 Even so, Waite in his remarks
went out of his way to issue what amounted to an advisory opinion that
acceptable relief did not include the easy option of dividing the Court
into panels so that it, presumably, would be able to move ahead at three
times its usual pace.279 He reminded his audience that the Constitution
precluded that alternative: "I beg you to note this language: One Su-
preme Court," he quoted from Article 111.280 "Not a Supreme Court or
Supreme Courts, but one-and only one."28'
271. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 409 (citation omitted).
272. Id.
273. See discussion supra note 234. Hunt suffered a paralytic stroke in January 1879, but clung
to his seat, even though he could do no judicial work, until he retired in early 1882. SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, supra note 17, at 209.
274. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 3,6, 26 Stat. 826, 827, 828; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
supra note 54, at 78-79 n.100.
275. TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 250 n.43.
276. Morrison R. Waite, Remarks of Chief Justice Waite, 36 ALB. L.J. 318, 318 (1887).
277. Id.
278. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 105-114 (1964).





As for intellectual leadership, there is little evidence that Waite led
his Court doctrinally in any consistent way. One reason for that had noth-
ing to do with Waite at all. The reality was that a few bright, articulate,
and doctrinally aware Justices were already in place when he arrived. It
would have been difficult for any new Chief to have led a Field, a Miller,
a Bradley, or, later, a Harlan. It is, after all, far easier to lead colleagues
who are in need of leadership. Felix Frankfurter much later pointed to
what was perhaps a second reason: "the stuff of the artist was not
him.' 282 Waite's opinions, noted the future Supreme Court Justice, were
"not delectable reading. That is a defect for which he properly suf-
fers. 283 Nevertheless, the limited appeal of his opinions, in contrast to
those of predecessors Marshall and Taney, "is due in part to something
else-to fulfillment of one of the greatest duties of a judge, the duty not
to enlarge his authority., 284 Instead, Waite's important intellectual ac-
complishment as the Chief Justice was that he tended to reinforce the
dominant doctrinal views that were present. For instance, he embraced
the limited understanding of the Slaughterhouse Cases,285 articulated by
Miller (and in sharp contrast to Field), regarding the limited intent and
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.286 The Court largely adhered to that
construction throughout Waite's tenure, in both economic and race dis-
crimination cases.287 Yet the significance of Waite's support of that view
should not be minimized. Chief Justice Chase cast a dissenting vote in
that five to four decision.288 Waite's endorsement of Miller's position
thus made the 1873 ruling far more enduring.
Also to be considered in the arena of intellectual leadership is the
all-important ruling in Munn v. Illinois, where Waite wrote for a seven-
Justice majority, affirming the authority of states to set the rates that
could be charged by grain warehouses, and presumably by all other en-
terprises, where property was "affected with a public interest., 289 Here,
however, Bradley was of great help to Waite as he was writing his opin-
ion. In conference, the Court had agreed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause was no barrier to rate-regulation in such in-
stances.290 Bradley's contribution lay in supplying his Chief with ample
foundation, by way of a treatise by an English jurist and English court
decisions, for the doctrine that the Munn Court was writing into Ameri-
291can constitutional law. Waite's imprint on Munn lay in his insistence
282. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
79 (Quadrangle Books 1964) (1937).
283. Id. at 80.
284. Id.
285. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
286. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79-80.
287. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
288. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111.
289. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126 (internal quotations omitted).
290. Id. at 125.
291. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 921-22.
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that (1) the Court should give legislators wide latitude in selecting the
property which fell within that category and that (2) once the right to
regulate was established, the reasonableness of the rate or other regula-
tion was a legislative, not a judicial, question.292
Munn was one of the so-called Granger Cases,293 all decided on the
same day.294 The others involved state regulation of railroad rates.
295
Those cases presented not only the due process issue that Munn resolved,
but a Commerce Clause problem as well.296 Waite steadfastly clung to
his view, in those cases, that state regulation of railroads was acceptable
under the Commerce Clause, even when it impacted interstate travel and
297shipments. It was on this critical point that his seven to two majority in
the Granger Cases became a six to three majority against his position
nine years later in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois.298
Miller, who had been in the majority in the Granger Cases, led the new
majority, with Bradley, Gray, and Waite in dissent.299 The Chief Justice
not only failed to command his Court on this vital question, but stead-
fastly refused to adjust his own views to accommodate the new majority.
Perhaps Waite's singular contribution to the Court derived from his
character, in the broadest sense of that word. It seemed to imbue all that
he did as Chief. The Court under Chief Justice Taney was badly sullied
by Dred Scott in 1857.300 It took a bevy of Lincoln appointees before the
Court appeared reasonably trustworthy again in the wake of secession
and the Civil War.30' Even then, an occasional anti-war or anti-
Reconstruction opinion such as Davis's in Ex parte Milligan, °2 or
Field's in the Test Oath Cases,30 3 was enough to awaken doubts about
the institution's fealty to the Union. °4
292. See id. at 924-925.
293. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 164.
294. Stephenson, supra note 155, at 920.
295. See, e.g., Peik v. Chicago & N.-W. Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
296. Peik, 94 U.S. at 175.
297. Id. at 175, 177-78.
298. 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
299. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 560, 577.
300. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
301. See Stephenson, supra note 155, at 902.
302. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
303. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
304. For example, while later generations have hailed Davis's defense of liberty in Milligan,
the Republican press and leading Republican lawmakers soundly chastised him at the time-"[t]his
constitutional twaddle of Mr. Justice Davis," editorialized the New York Herald, "will no more stand
the fire of public opinion than the Dred Scott decision." 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1836-1918, at 432 (Gryphon Editions, special ed. 1992) (1926). The
Court is "a relic of the past, nine old superior pettifoggers, old marplots, a formidable barrier to the
consummation of the great revolution." Id. at 432 n. 1.
Critics feared that Milligan would deny the authority of military commissions in the occupied
states of the old Confederacy and thus undermine Reconstruction. The criticism mystified Davis.
There was "not a word said in the opinion about reconstruction, & the power is conceded in insurrec-
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Chief Justice Chase, Taney's successor, generated his own liabili-
ties for the Court. A gifted but vain man 3°-it was said that there were
four persons in his conception of the Trinity-he was "afflicted," as Carl
Schurz recorded, "with the presidential fever., 30 6 It was the White
House, not the Chief Justiceship, which Chase coveted as the crowning
jewel on an already impressive list of lifetime achievements. °7 He had
sought the Republican nomination in 1856, 1860, 1864, and in 1868,
while Chief Justice, and had courted the affections of both parties, al-
though, due to his meticulous handling of the impeachment trial of Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson, his standing was far higher among Democrats
than Republicans. 30 8 Chase's opinion for a four to three bench in Hep-
burn v. Griswold,3° the first round of the legal tender litigation, that in-
validated the greenback-financing scheme enacted while he was Lin-
coln's Secretary of the Treasury, reinforced the view that he was trying
to ingratiate himself to the Democratic Party in hopes of a presidential
nomination in 1872.310
By contrast, Waite went out of his way to be both not Taney and not
Chase. He tried to avoid Taney's mistake in Dred Scott by embracing a
modest view of the federal judicial power.31' His most memorable
phrase, perhaps his only memorable phrase from fourteen years of ser-
vice, can be found in Munn: "For protection against abuses by legisla-
tures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts. 312 And he was
not Chase. When rumors circulated in 1876, in the last year of President
Grant's second term, that Waite might be a prospect for the Republican
nomination for the White House, the Chief Justice quickly squelched the
idea.313 "The Court is now looked upon as the sheet anchor," the Chief
Justice replied unequivocally to his nephew, John Turner Waite, a mem-
ber of the U.S. House of Representatives from Connecticut. 314 Waite
continued:
tionary States," he wrote in 1867. STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION
POLITICS 67 (1968) (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, even though the Court never ruled on
that aspect of Reconstruction policy, it seemed compatible with Milligan that civilians could be tried
before military tribunals if the civil courts in a region were open and functioning. Id.
305. See Donald Grier Stephenson, Jr., Chase, Salmon P., in 1 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 91, 91-93 (John R. Vile ed., 2001).
306. David Franklin Hughes, Salmon P. Chase: Chief Justice 98 (1963) (unpublished Doctoral
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author) (internal quotations omitted).
307. Leon Friedman, Salmon P. Chase, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1113, 1113 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel
eds., 1969).
308. JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY 188-189, 217-221, 373-373, 428-429
(1995); Friedman, supra note 307, at 1118, 1123; see WIECEK, supra note 44, at 87.
309. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 606 (1868).
310. Friedman, supra note 307, at 1117.
311. FRANKFURTER, supra note 282, at 78.
312. Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
313. TRIMBLE, supra note 252, at 141-42.
314. Id. at 142.
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Will it be if its Chief Justice is placed in the political whirlpool? The
office has come down to me covered with honor. When I accepted it,
my duty was not to make it a stepping-stone to something else, but to
preserve its purity and make my own name as honorable, if possible,
as that of my predecessors.... The other field is altogether untried. If
I should fail there, it would to a certain extent drag my office down
with me. No man ought to accept this place unless he takes a vow to
leave it as honorable as he found it.
315
And he did. Even Miller, who never seemed hesitant to point to
what he regarded as his Chief's failings, developed increased respect for
the man. 31 As senior associate Justice, he presided over the Court in
1885 during Waite's illness. 31 7 This experience with the full demands of
the office led Miller, in a letter to his brother-in-law, to pay his Chief a
backhanded compliment 318 -"I always knew that he did a great deal
more work than I ....
IV. APPRAISAL
"That he should develop any great strength as a judge was not to be
expected of him, and the public expectation was not disappointed," re-
marked the American Law Review soon after Waite's death.320 "Certain it
is that he left no great memorials of his strength as a judge," the influen-
tial journal continued, "and it is saying much in favor of the character of
Chief Justice Waite to say that he was able to avoid the display of any
great deficiencies as a lawyer while occupying the seat of Chief Jus-
tice.",321 Because Waite was so closely identified with the decisions of his
Court, the faint praise of this "it-could-have-been-worse" obituary would
seem to be as much a commentary on the Court as a whole, as it was on
its late presiding Justice. If so, then one may fairly conclude, with that
assessment as a baseline, that the stature of the Waite Court has waxed
rather than waned in the intervening twelve decades.
In at least one key respect, the Waite Court stands in moderate con-
trast to the Chase Court (1864-1873) that preceded it, and in sharp con-
trast to the Fuller Court (1888-1910) that followed: within the economic
realm, the Waite Court affirmed the power to govern.322 The corollary to
that affirmation was equally important: reasserted was the principle that
the primary check on government was electoral-through the legislative
315. Id.
316. See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 391.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 392.
319. Id. at 391.
320. Death of Chief Justice Waite, 22 AM. L. REV. 301, 303 (1888).
321. Id.
322. See infra notes 328-34, 367-99 and accompanying text. "Waite and his colleagues . . .
decided as they did with the firm conviction . . . that economic regulation was within American
experience and law." MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 315.
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process-not judicial.323 The Waite Court's overall deference to the
elected branches of both the national and state governments may nearly
place it in a class by itself among all other court eras. Rarely did one hear
cries of "judicial usurpation" or "government by judiciary., 324 Waite's
insistence in Munn that, for protection against legislative abuses, the
people were to "resort to the polls, not to the courts," echoed an idea that
was nearly as old as the Republic. 325 "We must be content to limit power
where we can," argued Justice James Iredell in 1798, "and where we
cannot, ... we must be content to repose a salutary confidence. '" 3 26 Chief
Justice Marshall was even more forceful: "The wisdom and the discre-
tion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which
their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other in-
stances ... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse.,
327
In less than a decade, the Chase Court, on eight occasions, held un-
constitutional all or parts of an act of Congress.328 This count does not
include Ex parte Milligan, which in 1866 held unconstitutional an execu-
tive order of the Lincoln administration. 329 The statistic was remarkable,
because it was at sharp variance with the Marshall and Taney Courts
(1801-1864), when only two acts of Congress were struck down in that
sixty three year period.330 Despite the Taney Court's debacle in Scott v.
Sanford, the Chase Court invigorated judicial power as a major counter-
weight to congressional power.
At first glance, the record of the Waite Court seemed nearly identi-
cal. Seven decisions invalidated all or part of an act of Congress, and an
eighth did so soon after Waite's death, but before Fuller arrived.331 How-
ever, it must be remembered that the Waite Court was more than four
years longer than the Chase Court.3 32 Moreover, it is important to note
the kind of legislation in those two Court periods that suffered the judi-
cial veto. Plainly, there is nothing comparable during the Waite years to
the Chase Court's holding on legal tender in Hepburn v. Griswold.33 3
Whatever else might be said about that case, it is undeniable that it fore-
closed as unconstitutional one of the essential means that Congress had
323. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 315.
324. Id. at 316.
325. Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
326. Iredell's statement was made in the context of the Court's rejecting a challenge to a Con-
necticut statute under the ex post facto clause. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798).
327. Marshall's statement was made with respect to the extent of Congress's commerce power.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
328. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 96.
329. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 142.
330. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 96.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626.
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chosen to finance the Civil War.334 And what would apply to a war
among the states, presumably would apply to a war with one of the great
powers of the world. From this perspective, the Chase Court complicated
the task of those charged with preservation of the nation.
The prominent exception to the Waite Court's general support for
national power lay in its hostility to federal civil rights legislation. Indeed
four of the seven invalidations while Waite was Chief fell into that cate-
gory; three involved predations against African Americans (United States
v. Reese,335 United States v. Harris,336 and the Civil Rights Cases337) and
one against Chinese (Baldwin v. Franks338). Of the remaining three, one
concerned trademarks (Trade-Mark Cases33 9 ), one struck down a crimi-
nal statute associated with bankruptcy (United States v. Fox34), and the
other invalidated a customs law on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds
(Boyd v. United States34 1). In fairness to Chase, it should be noted that,
based on his circuit court opinions, he was much more favorably dis-
posed than Waite toward a broad reading of the Reconstruction amend-
ments and civil rights legislation.342 Yet, as questionable as some of the
Waite Court's civil rights rulings might be, none of them threatened pa-
ralysis of the national government. Nearly anything the national govern-
ment wanted to do, the Waite Court seemed prepared to accept as consti-
tutionally permissible. One thinks especially of Waite's vision of the
commerce power in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co.,34 3 which rivaled Marshall's nationalism in Gibbons v.
Ogden.
344
Still, the hostility that the bench displayed to federal civil rights leg-
islation merits close attention in any appraisal of the Waite Court. The
record shows that the bench was more hospitable to claims brought by
private citizens against state laws and policies, which arguably infringed
the Fourteenth Amendment directly, than it was to upholding congres-
sional enactments designed to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth and
other Reconstruction amendments.345 Alongside such civil rights defeats
for the government in Reese and the Civil Rights Cases were civil rights
victories for individuals in Strauder v. West Virginia,346 Neal v. Dela-
334. See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 87.
335. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
336. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
337. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
338. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
339. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
340. 95 U.S. 670 (1877).
341. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
342. HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE 129 (Peter
Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., 1997).
343. 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
344. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1.
345. Compare Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304, 312 (1879), with United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548, 559 (1875).
346. Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
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ware,347 and Yick Wo v. Hopkins.348 The key to proving a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in a case brought by
an individual, however, lay in establishing racially derived invidious
discrimination. 349 In Justice Strong's words from Strauder, the Four-
teenth Amendment was violated by "unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored .... Where legislation was racially discrimi-
natory, but superficially treated blacks and whites "equally," the Waite
Court ordinarily let it pass, although Yick Wo was an obvious exception
to that pattern.351 That perspective lay at the heart of Pace v. Alabama,
352
and was a precursor to the Fuller Court's formal embrace of the separate-
but-equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson.
353
The Waite Court's stance obscured an important dynamic at work in
the protection of civil rights. Charges under any of the Reconstruction-
era civil rights laws would be brought by a federal prosecutor in the ap-
propriate judicial district.354 Upon observance of a crime or on the com-
plaint by a victim, that official could bring to bear the full prosecutorial
resources of the Department of Justice.355 An offense against a person
became an offense against the American people: hence the case name
United States v. Reese.356 To the degree that the Waite Court narrowed,
or otherwise invalidated, federal civil rights laws as it did in Reese and
United States v. Cruikshank, the role of the government's attorney was
severely marginalized.
Lawsuits to challenge state laws or policies that arguably were in
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment were exactly that: actions insti-
tuted by individuals, not by the United States government. In the Waite
Court era, these typically sprang from criminal prosecutions, as in chal-
lenges to racially based juror selection.357 Such challenges would be de-
veloped by counsel or by the defendants themselves.358 It would not be a
challenge propelled by the full weight of federal authority. Outside the
context of race discrimination in criminal prosecutions, the hostility of
local community opinion might effectively censor challenges to other
discriminatory practices. There might be a heavy price, in terms of in-
timidation, that any plaintiff would incur. That prospect alone might in-
cline someone to accept second-class citizenship instead of challenging
it. And without litigation, a court could not act.
347. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
348. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
349. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08.
350. Id. at 308.
351. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882).
352. See Pace, 106 U.S. at 584-85.
353. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
354. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'355. See MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 120-22.
356. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
357. See, e.g., Neal, 103 U.S. at 387.
358. YARBROUGH, supra note 198, at 146.
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Thus, the myopia of the Waite Court on civil rights lay in believing
that a person's rights would be properly vindicated through the ordinary
workings of the judicial process, relying on the Reconstruction amend-
ments alone, without the help of Congress. Perhaps because of their re-
cent memories of an invigorated Reconstruction-era Congress, there was
a latent suspicion among some Waite Justices of an enlarged federal
power.359 Whatever benefit the latter might bring seemed not to be worth
the cost, in most instances at least, of destruction of a widely shared vi-
sion of the Union as it was before the Civil War. The irony was that indi-
viduals would feel free to vindicate their rights only in the absence of the
very intimidation that the federal statutes, gutted in some instances by the
Waite Court, had been designed to prevent.
A second part of this dynamic involved the results of litigation.
Successful prosecutions brought by the government against persons vio-
lating the legal rights of another would mean fines and/or jail sentences
for the individuals found guilty.360 Not only would these perpetrators be
punished, but the punishments would perhaps make others think twice
before committing similar offenses. In contrast, the effects of an individ-
ual's success in convincing the Supreme Court that a particular state law
or policy violated constitutionally protected rights were often far more
limited. No one was fined or imprisoned. True, the courtroom victory
became a precedent that was to govern litigation in similar cases from
that time forward. Yet if a trial judge failed to heed the precedent, there
was little an individual could do beyond an appeal on that point to a
higher court, in the hope that the law would be applied correctly. The
difference was between vindication of individual rights by government
and vindication of the same rights by individuals.
Still a third part of this dynamic involved power. Especially with re-
spect to voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment, energetic en-
forcement backed by a generous construction of federal civil rights stat-
utes would have translated into a franchise generally free of racial dis-
crimination and so open to all otherwise eligible males. 361 Then, as now,
voting is empowerment. Denial of the right to vote condemns a person to
the mercies of those who do vote. This was Justice Hunt's point in his
Reese dissent: "Just so far as the ballot to... the freedmen is abridged, in
the same degree is their importance and their security diminished.,
362
"Punishment is the means; protection is the end.9363 The truth of that
comment became especially evident soon after the last of the federal
troops were withdrawn from the South in 1877.364 By the end of the cen-
359. FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 332.
360. Reese, 92 U.S. at 254 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
361. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 105-7 (2000).
362. Reese, 92 U.S. at 248 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 254 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
364. KEYSSAR, supra note 361, at 107.
[Vol. 81:2
THE WAITE COURT
tury, disfranchisement of blacks had become the rule in southern
365states.  Moreover, a harsh system of racial segregation entrenched itself
in southern legal systems that was mimicked by private discrimination
elsewhere in the nation.366
With the exception of this negativity toward federal civil rights leg-
islation, the Waite Court, in affirming national power, stands out in con-
trast not only to the Chase Court, but to the Fuller Court as well. During
its twenty-two years, Chief Justice Fuller's bench handed down fourteen
decisions that invalidated all or part of a congressional statute.367 That
number was somewhat higher per term than Waite's seven, but the real
difference lies in the significance of some of those fourteen. Among
them was Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., which struck down the
income tax enacted by Congress in 1894.368 In at least one respect, Pol-
lock was on a par with the Chase Court's ruling in Hepburn. Or at least
Justice Harlan seemed to think so in terms of the risk that the 1895 deci-
sion posed for the nation: "It strikes at the very foundations of national
authority, in that it denies to the general government a power [that] is, or
may become, vital to the very existence and preservation of the Union in
a national emergency.
'" 369
Also among the Fuller Court's fourteen negations was Adair v.
United States,37 which nullified the Erdman Act of 1898. That law was
an attempt by the federal government to use its commerce power in sup-
port of the rights of labor.37 1 The law prohibited yellow dog contracts, as
well as the firing or blacklisting of employees for union activity.372 Not
counted among the fourteen, because it emasculated but did not invali-
date a statute, was United States v. E. C. Knight Co. ,373 sometimes called
the Sugar Trust Case. Relying on an exceedingly narrow interpretation
of the commerce power, a five-Justice majority confined the constitu-
tionally acceptable application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 to
monopolies involving "commerce," as distinct from "manufacturing., 374
The Court placed the refining of sugar in the latter category, and so
pushed the sugar business beyond the statute's reach.375
Arguably, the Waite-Fuller Court comparison is unfair because
Congress flexed its muscles during the Fuller years in ways it did not
365. Id. at 107-13.
366. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 328-34, 346-49.
367. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 96.
368. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
369. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
370. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
371. KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 447.
372. See Adair, 208 U.S. at 169; YARBROUGH, supra note 198, at 181.
373. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
374. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 10.
375. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 379.
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while Waite was Chief Justice.37 6 So, the argument might go, one does
not know what the Waite-era Justices would have done had they been
faced with a similarly activist congressional agenda, beyond the realm of
civil rights. Perhaps, but the same contrasting pattern concerning the
power to govern emerges in the reaction of the Waite and Fuller Courts
to state legislation.
Outside the contexts of the Contracts and Commerce Clauses, the
authority of the states to legislate did not surface in American constitu-
tional law as a major issue until the very end of the Chase Court.37 7 This
occurred in the Slaughterhouse Cases, when the Court turned back a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state law restricting occupational
rights. 378 Munn v. Illinois,379 easily the most far-reaching decision on that
amendment's due process clause in the Waite period, exemplified the
380Waite Court's jurisprudence respecting the state police power. On no
occasion did the Waite Court strike down a statute as a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38' Practically to the
end, the Waite bench was prepared to allow states a free hand with re-
spect to rate regulation, even when those state-set rates had an impact on
382interstate commerce.
To be sure, near the close of the Waite era there were signs of judi-
cial impatience with the nearly complet, carte blanche handed state
legislatures in Munn.383 Just as oral argument was about to begin in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,384 a case challenging
taxation of certain railroad property, Waite informed counsel that the
bench was not interested in the question of whether the word "person" in
the Fourteenth Amendment included corporations. 385 "We are all of the
opinion that it does, 386 the Chief Justice said, thus making explicit for
the first time, and appearing to emphasize, an understanding that had
been implicit in the Court's decisions at least since the Granger Cases.
387
Mugler v. Kansas then signaled that the Court, in applying standards of
376. See id. at 370-371.
377. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62 ("The power here exercised by the legisla-
ture of Louisiana is ... one which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history of
this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may now be questioned in some of
its details.").
378. See id. at 78.
379. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
380. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 315.
381. See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 197-202. The first to do so seems to be Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
382. Compare Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876) (one of the
Granger Cases), with Wabash, 118 U.S. 557.
383. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
384. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
385. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. at 396.
386. Id.
387. EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND
DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 193-94 (Greenwood Press 1978) (1948).
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due process of law, would henceforth look for a connection between leg-
islative means and ends, even as it upheld the statute in question in that
case. 388
Yet it was the Fuller Court that pulled down the curtain on the era
of judicial self-restraint. In an opinion by Blatchford (joined by Fuller
and Brewer, plus Waite-era holdovers Field and Harlan, with Miller con-
curring separately), Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v.
Minnesota held that the reasonableness of rates could not be left by the
legislature to be determined by a state commission but, under the stan-
dards of Fourteenth Amendment due process, had to be subject to judi-
cial review.389 That decision completed a judicial revolution, contradict-
ing Waite's insistence in Munn that reasonableness of rates was a legisla-
tive, not a judicial, question. 390 The Court was well on its way to becom-
ing what Miller himself had feared in the Slaughterhouse Cases-a "per-
petual censor" of state legislation.391
The Fuller Court built on the Minnesota rate case in Smyth v.
Ames.392 Writing for a unanimous bench, Harlan not only invalidated a
set of rates promulgated by Nebraska, but, in the process of holding that
regulated industries were entitled to a fair return, laid out a formula by
which that return was to be determined.393 In the same year, in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana,394 the Fuller Court also found embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment a right not previously recognized by the Court: liberty of
contract. Employee and employer now enjoyed a constitutionally pro-
tected right to bargain individually over the terms of labor, free of undue
interference by the government.395 The implications of this new right
were vast, and were soon realized in Lochner v. New York,396 when
Fuller and four other members of his bench set aside a New York statute
limiting the hours of labor in bakeries. 397 Justice Rufus Peckham's opin-
ion for the majority asserted that it would be the Court's task to ascertain
what restrictions on liberty of contract were reasonable and which ones
were not.398 Until 1937, the ruling cast a long shadow of doubt over the
constitutionality of any governmental regulation of the workplace.399
388. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661-62.
389. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 134 U.S at 458-59.
390. Munn, 94 U.S. at 133.
391. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
392. 171 U.S. 361 (1898).
393. Smyth, 171 U.S. at 365.
394. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
395. KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 403.
396. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
397. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
398. Id. at 56-57.
399. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 487-88. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Adkins in turn had been
inspired by Lochner's reliance on liberty of contract. See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45.
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Situated as it was between the Chase and Fuller Courts, the Waite
Court was transitional, but not merely in terms of its chronological place
in the development of the federal judicial system and the questions that it
confronted. It was transitional as well in terms of its rulings. On matters
of civil rights, it was reluctant to admit that the Reconstruction amend-
ments had radically altered the constitutional structure of the Union.400 It
acknowledged some change, but not much.40 1 Today it is commonplace
to find references in the literature to the Reconstruction amendments as
"the second American Constitution. ' 4°2 Most of Waite's bench did not
read them that way. To the degree that the outcome of the Civil War
had launched a second revolution in American government, that revolu-
tion, temporarily at least, had ground to a halt by the 1870s and 1880s.404
It would fall to later Congresses and Courts to recognize broader protec-
tions within those amendments.4 5 In view of the depth and breadth of
Jim Crow legislation that mushroomed in the years that followed, and the
pervasive and ingenious devices that would be deployed until well after
the middle of the twentieth century to keep African Americans from the
polls, 40 6 the Waite Court might have saved the nation much anguish by
accelerating, not retarding, congressional protection of individual
rights.4 7
Still, it may be unfair to criticize Waite's Court for an absence of
omniscience. The trend of the Court's civil rights decisions after 1875
only conformed to dominant white opinion in both the North and
South.40 8 If blacks gained their freedom as a result of a war among
whites, they were, for a very long time, denied the full realization of that
freedom because of a reconciliation among whites. Sectional harmony
took priority over fulfillment of the promises of Reconstruction. Thus,
the fact that Waite's bench did not do what a late twentieth century
bench would doubtless have done is only to recognize the fallibility that
pervades all human undertakings. His Court was, after all, a collection of
jurists whose world views had been shaped by a pre-Civil War, mainly
Jacksonian, America. It was that America, minus slavery, that most of
them seemed to want to preserve.
If so, that goal-outside the context of civil rights-generally
served the nation well. On questions of the scope of the state police
400. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 314.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 313 (internal quotations omitted).
403. Id. at 313-14.
404. KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 349; MAGRATH, supra note 2, at 313.
405. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 103, at 595-605.
406. See generally CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN
FEDERAL JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS (1973); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW (Galaxy Book ed. 1963) (1957).
407. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Reese, 92 U.S. 214; MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 132.
408. MAGRATH, supra note 1, at 133, 315.
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power with respect to property, the Waite Court's understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment was very close to the interpretation that controls
today.40 9 On Commerce Clause issues, viewed in the light of the change
of course in the Wabash case, against which Waite dissented, its holdings
were not that far from those of later courts. On Bill of Rights questions
that have so defined the Court since 1937, the Waite Court deserves
credit at least for engaging a few of them seriously. 410 If Waite, as Chief,
and his Court did not achieve true greatness, he and they at least touched
the hems of greatness.
On March 13, 1874, just nine days after his swearing-in as Chief
Justice, Waite wrote a letter to his wife Amelia who was still in Toledo at
the time. "What does all this mean? I suppose I shall realize it all bye and
bye. But it seems strange now., 4 11 Little did he realize what lay in store.
409. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
410. See, e.g., Jackson, 96 U.S. 727; Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145; Siebold, 100 U.S. 371; Kilbourn,
103 U.S. 168; Curtis, 106 U.S. 371; Hurtado, 110 U.S. 516; Boyd, 116 U.S. 616; Hopt v. Utah, 120
U.S. 430 (1887).
411. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Amelia Waite (Mar. 13, 1874) (on file in Morrison R.
Waite Papers, Library of Congress).
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